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SRAM-based FPGAs are increasingly attractive in the aerospace industry for
their field programmability and low cost. Unfortunately, they suffer from cosmic
radiation induced Single Event Effects (SEEs). In safety-critical applications, the
dependability of the design is a prime concern since failures may have catastrophic
consequences. Hence, an early analysis of dependability of such safety-critical ap-
plications will enable designers to develop systems that meets high dependability
requirements, such as the DO-254 standard. In this thesis, we propose a high-level
dependability and performability analysis methodology based on probabilistic model
checking. Compared to the pen-and-pencil and discrete-event simulation approach,
our methodology is more accurate due to the use of an automated formal verification
technique. Moreover, compared to fault injection or beam testing, analysis at early de-
sign stages can guide designers to build more reliable designs reducing the overall cost
and effort. The proposed methodology can perform three different types of analysis:
evaluation of available design options, optimization of scrub intervals while satisfying
its design assurance level requirements, and optimal partitioning of Triple-Modular
Redundant (TMR) Systems. Such analysis can also guide designers to adopt proper
mitigation technique(s), such as rescheduling, TMR, TMR with less frequent scrubs,
or even can help to decide the number of TMR partitions for a given scrub intervals.
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Starting from a high-level description of a system, based on the preferred analysis, a
Markov model or Markov (reward) model is constructed from the extracted Control
Data Flow Graph (CDFG) and the failure/mitigation parameters for the targeted
FPGA. Such modeling and exhaustive analysis elaborated using a probabilistic model
checking technique can capture all the failures and repairs possible (according to some
general model) in the system within the radiation environment. To illustrate the ap-
plicability of the proposed approach, we present our quantitative analysis obtained
from DSP benchmark circuits.
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“In less than 70 hours, three astronauts will be launched on the flight
of Apollo 8 from the Cape Kennedy Space Center on a research journey
to circle the moon. This will involve known risks of great magnitude and
probable risks which have not been foreseen. Apollo 8 has 5,600,000 parts
and 1.5 million systems, subsystems and assemblies. With 99.9 percent
reliability, we could expect 5,600 defects. Hence the striving for perfection
and the use of redundancy which characterize the Apollo program.”
— Jerome Lederer, Director of Manned Space Flight Safety, NASA, 1968.
The Avionics and space industries pose extra challenges to designers of electronic
devices due to the critical nature of embedded electronic systems and their exposure
to a radioactive environment that is significantly harsher than at sea level. It has been
reported that airplane flying altitudes can have an environment that is 300 times [68]
more radioactive than at sea level. High-energy neutrons caused by the interaction of
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cosmic rays with the earths atmosphere may cause temporary or permanent failures
in the electronic systems used in avionics and spacecrafts.
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have been employed in aerospace ap-
plications for more than a decade. Reconfigurable computing with FPGAs is known to
perform well in space-based applications such as Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR),
software defined radio and hyperspectral imaging. With respect to power consump-
tion and speed, FPGAs can outperform general-purpose CPUs. Also, due to field pro-
grammability, the absence of non-recurring engineering costs, low manufacturing costs
and other advantages, SRAM-based FPGAs are increasingly attractive compared to
ASICs. Since in SRAM-based FPGAs the configuration bitstream is stored in volatile
SRAM, it can be corrupted by interaction with high-energy radiated particles such
as protons, neutrons, and heavy ions that are abundant in aerospace environments.
The effects of these particles on electronics are commonly known as single-event ef-
fects (SEE) [57, 5]. Several types of SEE are relevant to FPGAs. Single-event upsets
(SEUs) occur when one or more bits in memory changes state due to a radiation
event. Since the state of the FPGA configuration memory specifies the application
architecture, SEUs in the configuration memory are particularly harmful to the system
operations.
Different vendors have provided radiation-hardened FPGAs to meet the require-
ments of the avionic and space industries [88]. However, these devices are very ex-
pensive as they are manufactured in relatively low volumes and they also lag by
two or three technology nodes when compared to commercial products. For exam-
ple, if Xilinx 28-nm (non rad-hard) Virtex-7 (XC7V2000T) is compared to a Xilinx
65-nm rad-hard Virtex-5 (XQR5VFX130), the Virtex-7 offers 14.9 times more Con-
figuration Logic Block (CLB) slices, 4.3 times more Block RAM memory and 6.8
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Table 1.1: Comparison of FPGA Technologies [20]
Feature SRAM Flash Antifuse
Reprogrammable Yes Yes No
Volatile Configuration Yes No No
Live On Startup No Yes Yes
Memory Cell Size Large Small-Medium Small
Radiation Sensitivity High Low-Medium Low-None
Capacity High Medium Low
Reprogramming Speed Fast Slow-Medium N/A
Total Dose Tolerance Medium-High Low High
times more Digital Signal Processing (DSP) slices running at twice the maximum
frequency. Therefore, there is a growing need to analyze the possible utilization of
commercial SRAM-based FPGA components in harsh radioactive environment such
as outer space. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the features of the different FPGA tech-
nologies discussed, and is meant to provide a quick comparison of the main features,
advantages and drawbacks. Here, capacity refers to the density and amount of logic
that can be synthesised onto a single FPGA.
Dependability (reliability, availability and safety) and performability (reliability
and performance combined) are major concerns in safety-critical and mission-critical
applications that are common in the aerospace industry. To deal with SEUs, design-
ers mostly rely on redundancy-based solutions, such as Triple Modular Redundancy
(TMR) [21] for high reliability and configuration memory (Configuration Bits) scrub-
bing [5] to mitigate SEUs for high availability. Scrubbing is traditionally done in the
order of milliseconds. Such fast scrubbing consumes high power [67, 59] and hence
scrubbing at a lower frequency is desired [84]. Strict power budgets of typical deep
space missions such as Voyager-1, Voyager-2 [98], or even the Mars missions set a need
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for delayed and optimized scrubs (in the order of hours or days) to save power. Scrub-
bing is often used in conjunction with other forms of mitigation techniques such as
TMR or spare components, to increase reliability. However, in cases where performa-
bility is a major concern, redundancy-based solutions might not always be the default
choice. Thus, to choose the right design options and parameters, it is very important
to evaluate the relationships between reliability, availability, safety, and performabil-
ity with the adopted fault mitigation technique, fault coverage and mission time. To
further increase dependability, TMR partitioning [75, 46] can be adopted. Although,
assessing the optimal number of partitions at early design stages has yet to be ad-
dressed. Such early analysis will allow a designer to develop more reliable and efficient
solutions, and may also reduce the overall cost associated with the design effort. Our
work aims at achieving these goals.
Broadly, there are three possible ways to analyze SEU sensitivity in FPGA-
based designs: 1) hardware testing such as particle beams and laser testing, which
allows to obtain cross-sectional area information about the design; with the knowl-
edge of flux, critical charge and charge collection efficiency, we can compute the SEU
rate [38]; 2) fault injection emulation or simulation; and 3) analytical techniques.
These three types of techniques are complementary, and they are typically applied
at different design flow steps. Hardware testing techniques are the most realistic if
the true operating conditions can be reproduced, which is not often the case. These
techniques require finished implementations, and they may cause irreversible damage
to the device under test when performed; therefore, they are very costly [58]. Some
sufficient use of hardware testing techniques may, however, be mandatory for certifi-
cation purposes in critical applications such as in aerospace electronic systems. Fault
injection is also a useful method, but test time grows with the number of possible
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test cases [14]. On the other hand, analytical methods tend to be relatively less ac-
curate in some aspects. Nonetheless, they can provide much better controllability
and observability, while enabling quick estimation of soft error susceptibility, without
the risk of damaging devices [6, 86]. Moreover, they can capture features of the true
test conditions that would be very hard to accurately reproduce when bombarding
the circuit or while performing fault injection. Analytical estimation traditionally
provides information at an earlier stage in the design cycle compared to the other two
techniques.
We propose a means by which formal verification methods can be applied at
early design stages to analyze the dependability and performability of reconfigurable
systems. In particular, the focus is on probabilistic model checking [25]. It is used to
verify systems whose behavior is stochastic in nature. Probabilistic model checking
is a well known formal verification technique, mainly based on the construction and
analysis of a probabilistic model, typically a Markov chain. The main advantage is
that the analysis is exhaustive, which results in numerically exact answers to the
temporal logic queries that contrast with discrete-event simulations [53], in which
approximate results are generated by averaging results from a large number of random
samples. Another extra advantage of this technique is its ability to express detailed
temporal constraints on the system’s executions in contrast to analytical methods.
There are numerous probabilistic model checking tools available based on nu-
merical and statistical methods such as YMER [101], VESTA [81], MRMC [48] and
PRISM [55]. In terms of memory consumption and performance, YMER is the best
option [43]. Unfortunately YMER has a limited range of supported probabilistic
operators (no unbounded until and steady-state operators). Furthermore, being a
statistical model checker, YMER may report the wrong answer, and has done so in
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a few cases [69]. YMER outperforms the other statistical model checker VESTA.
VESTA’s memory consumption is rather constant, but more in the order of PRISMs
memory usage. However, its runtime varies considerably. For certain properties, it
was found that VESTA does even terminate within 24 hours on a model with only
100 states [43]. While comparing the probabilistic model checking tools based on
numerical methods, it is known that MRMC may outperform PRISM for small and
medium-sized models in terms of speed and memory usage. PRISM is able to check
much larger models when compared with the other numerical tools [69].
PRISM is an open source probabilistic model checker, and it also includes mul-
tiple model checking engines, several of which are based on symbolic implementations
(using binary decision diagrams and their extensions, such as Multi-Terminal Binary
Decision Diagrams). These engines enable probabilistic verification of models of com-
prising up to 1010 states (on average, PRISM handles models with up to 107 − 108
states). PRISM also features a variety of advanced techniques such as abstraction
refinement and symmetry reduction. It is worth mentioning that it also supports
approximate/statistical model checking through a discrete event simulation engine.
PRISM also offers excellent support via it’s user group. In the PRISM model checker,
probabilistic finite state models are constructed using real value probabilities asso-
ciated with the transitions between various states of the model. It is known that
probabilistic model checking tools run out of memory quickly when the state space is
very large. In contrast, probabilistic theorem proving techniques [36], in theory, have
no limitations regarding the number of states. However, they are interactive, which
means that human interaction is required. Also, analyzing a system in a theorem
proving environment requires an infrastructure for reasoning about the underlying
mathematical concepts of probability and statistics.
6
In our proposed methodology, we are interested in addressing three issues in
SRAM-based FPGA designs at early design stages: Design options analysis, Design
Assurance Level (DAL) verification with scrub optimization, and optimal TMR parti-
tioning for reliability improvement. Current work in the area of design options analysis
[47, 62, 51] either separates the dependability analysis from the performance/area, cov-
erage analysis or does not analyze such safety-critical applications at an early design
stage. Commercial tools for reliability analysis, such as isograph [41], cannot be used
for performability evaluation of such systems as they do not support Markov reward
models [87]. Since the probabilistic model checker PRISM allows reward modeling,
our work overcomes this limitation. Our contribution to optimize the scrub interval
for saving power contrasts with other works in this area [22, 60], where the repair
rates are estimated as exponential distributions. We model the deterministic repair
intervals using the Erlang process [30] for better accuracy. Indeed, nonexponential
holding time distributions can be approximated by inserting multiple intermediate
states between every main state pairs. Our work on optimal TMR partitioning over-
comes the limitations of the current approaches reported in [75, 46]. To be more
precise, those approaches either employ the fault injection technique or are limited by
the assumption of equal sized partitions prone to Single Bit Upsets (SEUs) only.
To analyze such a design at a high level using our methodology, we start from
its Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG) [49] representation, obtained from a high-level
description of the design expressed using a language such as C++. Depending on
the desired type of analysis, the possible implementation options of the CDFG, with
different sets of available components and their possible failures, fault recovery and
repairs in the radiation environment are then modeled with the PRISM modeling
language [76]. The failure rates of the components are obtained from a worst-case
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component characterization library. Various dependability properties are then auto-
matically verified to check if the system meets the requirements.
1.2 State-of-the-Art in SEU Analysis
The modeling and analysis of SEU relevant faults and their mitigation for depend-
ability analysis is an active research area. As mentioned earlier, the most practiced
approaches are fault injection and beam testing (radiation ground testing). Analyti-
cal methods were also proposed. Assadi et al. [7, 33] presented an analytical model
based on soft-error propagation at gate level using the concept of Error Propagation
Probability (EPP). Shazil et al. [82] used a similar concept, but used a satisfiability
(SAT) solver with EPP to calculate the exact soft-error rate. The Probabilistic theo-
rem proving technique was also employed in this area. Abbasi [4] extended the work of
Hasan [36] by formalizing statistical properties of continuous random variables as well
as the probability distribution properties of multiple random variables. Abbasi used
this formalization for the formal reliability analysis of engineering systems using the-
orem proving. On the other hand, in our work, we focus on Markov modeling of SEU
impacts and their possible mitigation techniques. Such modeling enables evaluating
the dependability of a system at the early design stages from its CDFG description
using the probabilistic model checking technique. The state-of-the-art literature that
are most relevant to the three main parts of our methodology are described as follows.
1.2.1 Modeling and Analysis of Fault Mitigation Techniques
The modeling and analysis of different fault mitigation techniques, for both ASICs
and FPGAs, has been widely reported [16, 39, 45, 91, 9]. When a resource fails (due
to a configuration bit flip), an alternative CDFG scheduling using high-level synthesis
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techniques can be derived to continue the system’s operation using the remaining
resources, most likely at a lower throughput. Such a fault tolerance approach was
introduced by Borgerson et al., Hong et al. and Karri et al. in [16, 39, 45], respectively,
for fault-secure microarchitectures and multiprocessors (a computation on a set of
processors is fault-secure if no fault in the computation generated by a faulty processor
goes undetected). For FPGA-based designs, such a fault recovery technique can be
adopted as well. However, in that case the controller for rescheduling the operations
will need to be highly reliable. This controller can be implemented in a separate chip
with proper fault-tolerance mechanisms.
In [91], Tosun et al. proposed a reliability-centric high-level synthesis approach
to address SEUs. Their framework uses reliability characterization to select the most
reliable implementation for each operation fulfilling latency and area constraints. In
addition, researchers dedicated a lot of efforts to modeling the behavior of gracefully
degradable large-scale systems using continuous-time Markov reward models [9, 40].
In [24], Cheshmikhani et al. presented the modeling and analysis of a fault tree based
on stochastic logic. To produce models, probabilistic analysis of all different types of
gates is carried out first, and then probabilistic models are converted to equivalent
stochastic logic gates. It is worth mentioning that unlike Markov chains, a classical
fault tree is limited to modeling only non-repairable systems.
Fault coverage has a considerable impact on systems’ reliability and safety, and
many papers reported approaches for safety modeling and dependability improvement
mostly based on improving the fault detection coverage. The impact of coverage on
reliability with a quantitative assessment of different types of systems were performed
and reported by Xing et al., Delong et al. and Verlinden et al. in [100, 31, 95].
Always setting a target of 100% coverage is expensive in terms of time and cost, as
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well as unnecessary in many cases. Unfortunately, none of these works address the
relationship between fault coverage, different fault mitigation techniques and mission
time for early design analysis.
Smith et al. presented a case study in [83] to measure the performance of a mul-
tiprocessor system using a continuous-time Markov reward model (MRM). Similar to
this work, Kumar et al. [51] presented another MRM-based approach for analyzing
the performance, area and reliability metric of a design. In this work the transistor
lifetime was used to model the reliability and performance; hence, the model is com-
posed of non-repairable modules. The use of a non-formal commercial tool (such as
the isograph [41]) makes their approach quite rigid in terms of analysis. Moreover, in
their proposed approach, reward calculation is manual, which is a major bottleneck
of their work.
1.2.2 TMR and Scrub Modeling
Researchers have put a lot of efforts into hardening SRAM-based FPGA designs using
TMR and scrubbing. In [15], Bolchini et al. presented a design flow to implement
SEU hardened systems implemented with SRAM-based FPGAs. Three independent
strategies were proposed. The proposed strategies are the TMR-based techniques,
the TMR coupled with partial reconfiguration and some specific local re-design of the
critical portion of the design to overcome TMR failures. Quinn et al. [78] presented
a number of possible radiation-induced faults in SRAM-based FPGAs and their mit-
igation methods. However, they did not provide any model for the estimation of the
rate at which those errors happen and how to handle them at an early design stage.
An important class of applications with deterministic maintenance and repair times
was proposed by Trivedi et al. in [23]. Their work presented a steady-state analysis
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of the periodic preventive maintenance problem with general failure and repair time
distributions obtained by solving a semi-Markov process.
All these works mentioned above either use semi-Markov models or assume a
time interval between scrubs to follow exponential distribution, which is not accu-
rate in real world scenarios. Even though semi-Markov processes have been employed
to model deteriorating systems by allowing the holding time distributions to be non-
exponential, it is assumed that the mathematical formulations of semi-Markov models
[29] are so complicated that they are not analytically tractable. Some of the works
mentioned above are mostly focused on designing a more robust TMR solution and
none explored the effect of scrub intervals on the FPGA dependability. In our work,
we are interested in using formal verification techniques as they can guarantee exact
solutions. We model the periodic scrub using conventional Markov chains. Nonex-
ponential holding time distributions in Markov chains are approximated by inserting
multiple intermediate states based on a phase-type distribution.
1.2.3 TMR partitioning
Reliability and availability predictions of TMR have been heavily studied recently.
Tambara et al. [89] reported the effectiveness of different TMR schemes implemented
with a different level of granularity after evaluating them experimentally (using beam
testing). In contrast, Wang et al. [97] proposed an analytical model for systems with
TMR, TMR with EDAC and TMR with scrubbing. The authors discussed Markov
modeling of these techniques; however, frequent voting or partitioning was not ad-
dressed. Sterpore et al. presented an interesting scrubbing approach for TMRed
designs in [85]. They presented a design flow to scrub each domain in a TMR in-
dependently to maximize availability. In this approach, each partition is scrubbed
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on-demand when required. Since TMR is very expensive in terms of area and power,
another interesting way of implementing TMR, known as “selective TMR” was intro-
duced by Pratt et al. in [74]. In their work, they showed how TMR can be applied
only on selected portions of a design to reduce cost. Even though some level of relia-
bility is sacrificed in this approach, in terms of area constraint, their tool maximizes
the reliability.
TMR partitioning was mainly addressed in two papers. Pratt et al. [75] pro-
posed a reliability model for partitioned TMR, but only for designs with equal sized
partitions. Lima et al. [46] demonstrated the effect of Domain Crossing Events
(DCEs) and how to insert the voter cleverly in a design. In their work, they ana-
lyzed different partitioning schemes for the same design, and using the fault injection
technique, they find the optimal number of TMR partitions suitable for that design.
Our work contrasts with all of these related works mentioned above. We focus mostly
on the modeling of both Single Bit Upsets (SBUs) and Multi Bit Upsets (MBUs) for
early analysis of a design. The proposed modeling can handle both equal and not
equal sized partitions. Apart from just measuring the dependability metrics, such a
methodology can help in analyzing the relationship between the number of partitions,
the scrub interval, and the mission time at early design stages to improve confidence
in a design.
1.3 Proposed Methodology
In Figure 1.1, we present the proposed methodology. We start from the CDFG of the
application extracted from the high-level description of the design. The CDFG model
is used to represent the functionality of the selected C/C++ modeled algorithm. Such
































Figure 1.1: Proposed methodology
also capable of representing all behaviors present in an algorithm. Different tools
such as GAUT [28], SUIF [32], etc. can be used to extract the CDFG from a high-
level design description expressed using a language (such as C/C++). C/C++ is
the dominant high-level language in embedded system programming. However, the
approach can be applied equally well to other languages, such as Java or an older
language like Fortran. The C/C++ model can be written by the designer or can
be generated automatically in case the design is modeled in Matlab/Simulink. The
embedded coder (formerly RTW) toolbox can be used to perform the transformation.
The idea of the CDFG extraction and characterization library is inspired by [90];
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however, we use the GAUT tool as it is a free tool for academic use that is also user-
friendly. We also developed a version of our characterization library [Bio-Cf5] using
the information in [90] to calculate their SEU rate in the higher earth orbit.
Once the CDFG is extracted, depending on the type of analysis desired (showed
as orange boxes), one of the three branches can be chosen in our methodology. Each
of the orange boxes has its own flow that will be described in detail in the relevant
chapters. The design option analysis focuses on the evaluation of available design op-
tions and the use of rescheduling [16] for optimization of reliability and performance.
The scrub optimization/DO-254 Analysis emphasizes the accurate modeling and op-
timization of scrubbing for saving power. This branch of the methodology can also
be used to verify if the design meets the Design Assurance Level (DAL) described in
DO-254 [65]. The optimal approach for partitioning a TMRed system is analyzed in
the TMR partitioning branch. For this purpose, we model the effect of single and
multiple-bit upsets on the design that enable us to quantitatively analyze the number
of TMR partitions with the adequate scrub frequency required for the design.
All of these analyses require the use of a characterization library that charac-
terizes the failure rate and area for various components such as different types of
adders, multipliers, and so on. Each node in the CDFG defining basic operations
can be directly mapped into one of these components in the library. The details of
this characterization library development will be discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.
In our work, we use the first-order worst case scenario for the development of the
characterization library. Note that we use the characterization library to obtain the
failure rate of the components in the Markov chain model and the methodology is
generic enough to be used with a different characterization library with more precise
and accurate data, without any significant changes.
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The modeling of these three types of analysis in our methodology is based on
either Continuous Time Markov Chains or Markov Reward Models. Once described in
the PRISM modeling language [54], the PRISM model checker automatically analyzes
the dependability properties. In the case of stochastic modeling, properties are usually
expressed in some form of extended temporal logic such as the Continuous Stochastic
Logic (CSL) [37]. CSL is a stochastic variant of the well-known Computational Tree
Logic (CTL) [25]. If the system does not meet the requirements, then the mitigation
approach is modified, and the analysis is repeated again.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the methodology based on the probabilistic
model checking technique to qualitatively analyze the dependability of SRAM FPGA-
based aerospace applications. Since fault injection and beam testing requires the
finished implementation of the design and comes with an associated cost and high
risk, our methodology can be used for early dependability evaluation. This will guide
designers to adopt the proper mitigation technique or the combination of mitigation
techniques to make a more reliable, efficient and robust design. This may save on
design effort, design time and may also reduce the overall cost of the product. We
list below the main contributions of this work with references to related publications
provided in the Biography section at the end of this thesis.
1. We developed Markov Reward Models to analyze design options with respect
to reliability, availability, safety, and performability-area tradeoff for early design de-
cisions. The quantitative results from our obtained model show some important ob-
servations such as the fact that high coverage is not always helpful for gaining high
reliability, and that scrubbing delay also has a considerable impact. Regarding safety,
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using our models, we demonstrate how the scrubbing interval affects the safety of
available design options with the same fault coverage. We prove that in some cases,
redundancy-based solutions might not be always the best choice as one may expect.
Alternatively, for those cases, rescheduling in conjunction with scrubbing can be a
good option. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to evaluate such relation-
ships at early design stages using probabilistic model checking [Bio-Jr2, Bio-Cf5].
2. We developed the Markov model for reconfigurable systems with periodic
scrub and TMR using conventional Markov chains (instead of semi-Markov chains).
This enables us to assess the system using a probabilistic model checker in order
to optimize the scrub interval. Using the same model, we also verify if a system
meets the design assurance level to comply with the DO-254 and also high-availability
requirements. Unlike the traditional approach where the repair rates are estimated as
exponential distributions, we model the deterministic repair intervals using the Erlang
process [30] for better accuracy [Bio-Cf3, Bio-Cf4].
3. To analyze the TMR partitioning at an early design stage, we developed
Markov models that can handle both the equal sized or non-equal sized partitions.
Besides, these models can quantitatively assess the effect of both SBUs and MBUs on
TMR partitions. Our analysis shows that increasing the number of TMR partitions
also increases the design reliability for the case of SBUs. In contrast, for designs
that are prone to both SBUs and MBUs an optimal number of partitions indeed
exists. We prove that with an increased number of partitions, less frequent scrub
will be required to meet a target reliability. On the other hand, a smaller number of
partitions will require more frequent scrubs. Using our methodology, it is possible to
assess the required scrub frequency and the number of TMR partitions at early design
stages for a specific mission time. [Bio-Jr3]
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1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide a brief overview
of SEUs and configuration scrubbing. We also provide in this chapter an introduction
to probabilistic model checking, the PRISM model checker and some basic definitions
for some relevant dependability metrics.
In Chapter 3, we present the reliability, availability, safety, and performability
modeling of design options using Markov Reward Models (MRMs). We also present
modeling results to support our observations.
The modeling with Erlang process for approximating a constant time delay to
optimize the scrub interval is discussed in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we also show
with a case study how the proposed models can be used for verification of DAL
compliance.
In Chapter 4, we present the details of modeling the SBU and MBU impacts in
a partitioned TMR system. We analyze a system for both the SEUs and MBUs, and
quantitatively analyze the required number of portions with proper scrub frequency.





In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the concepts required to understand
this thesis. We start by introducing the Single Event Effects (SEEs) and the different
types that may occur in FPGAs. Since this thesis mostly focuses on Single Event
Upsets (SEUs), the consequences of SEUs FPGAs are also be introduced in this
chapter. In addition, we also provide the detail of fault mitigation techniques such as
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) and scrubbing of configuration bitstreams. We
also provide definitions of various dependability metrics that will be assessed in this
thesis. We conclude this chapter by providing a short overview of the probabilistic
model checking — the formal verification technique that we used in our methodology.
2.1 Single Event Effects
The harsh radioactive environment in space may affect the sensitive electronic systems.
As shown in Figure 2.1, when charge from radiation particles is impinging on a device,
it has the potential of altering the internal state of, or damaging, the device. Such
incidents are known as Single Event Effects (SEEs).
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Figure 2.1: SEE in FPGAs [18]
As shown in Figure 2.2, different types of SEEs that can occur in FPGAs can be
divided into soft errors and hard errors. We provide the summary of different types
of SEEs as follows, however, in this thesis, we deal with the Single Event Upsets only.
2.1.1 Soft Errors
Soft errors (recoverable) are upsets to the device operation and are self-correcting in
time or are correctable by rewriting a memory element. The three subclasses of soft
errors are Single-event transients (SETs), Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single-
Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs) that can be described as follows:
1. Single-Event Transients (SETs) result when a high-energy particle impacts a
combinatorial path of a device and can induce a voltage/current spike. If the pulse-
width of this spike is sufficient and arrives at the right time, it can propagate through
the circuit to a state flip-flop or latch.
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Figure 2.2: Types of SEEs [99]
2. Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) are the result of high-energy particles causing a
change in the state of a memory element (SRAM, flash, flop, or latch). SEUs can be
categorized as single-bit or multi-bit upsets (SBUs or MBUs). SBUs are by far the
most common SEE seen in avionics applications [99].
3. Single-Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs) are disruptions to normal device
operation. These types of effects alter the functionality of the circuit and typically
require reconfiguration/reset or power cycling for recovery.
2.1.2 Hard Errors
Errors that cause lasting damages to devices are classified as hard errors (non-recoverable).
The three subclasses of hard errors are Single-event latch-up (SEL), Single-event
burnout (SEB) and Single-event gate rupture (SEGR) described as follows:
1. Single-Event Latch-up (SEL) is a circuit latch-up induced by radiation. This
latch-up can be either permanent or clearable with power cycling.
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2. Single-Event Burnout (SEB) is a short-circuiting caused when a high-energy
ion impacts a transistor source, causing forward biasing. SEBs are typically a threat to
power MOSFETs but are also seen in IGBTs, high-voltage diodes, and similar circuits.
3. Single-Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) is a plasma spiked caused by a high-
energy ion impact, resulting in rupture of the gate oxide insulation.
2.2 Single Event Upsets in SRAM-based FPGAs
FPGAs are configurable logic devices that implement logic circuits with a fabric that
includes Look-up tables (LUTs), memories and routing resources that connect the
LUTs and memories. LUTs are used to implement logic equations. In contrast,
memories are used for implementing sequential logic and storage. In a reconfigurable
FPGA, the configuration memory is a collection of static memory cells storing the
bitstream. Bitstream bits set the values of the LUTs, flip-flops and memory initial-
ization values, and states of switches and connection boxes that route signals through
the FPGA. For Virtex devices from Xilinx, the configuration memory is composed
of SRAM cells. Those cells are arranged in frames of 32-bit configuration words. In
Virtex-5, there are 41 words in each frame [1].
Several interfaces are provided for accessing configuration memory for differ-
ent purposes. The Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface is typically used for
initial configuration. The Xilinx-specific SelectMAP interface is used for runtime
read-back and reconfiguration. It can be configured for a bus width of 8, 16, or 32
bits. Xilinx provides the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP) to expose the
SelectMAP interface to user logic. The ICAP eliminates the need for an external
runtime-configuration manager by allowing the FPGA to read back and reconfigure
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itself.
The FPGA configuration is stored in volatile SRAMs. Therefore, interaction
with high-energy radiated particles that are common in the aerospace environment,
such as protons, neutrons, and heavy ions, may corrupt the FPGA configuration.
Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) occur when one or more bits in configuration memories
change state due to a radiation event. If only one bit of a word is affected, then
it is called a Single-Bit Upset (SBU). If more than one bit are affected, then it is
an MBU. The state of the FPGA configuration memory defines the architecture of
the application. As a consequence, SEUs in the configuration memory are not only
harmful but could also result in a catastrophic failure of the design. Many bits in the
bitstream that are not employed in a given design do not affect system operation if an
upset occurs on them. A portion of the configuration memory bits that are employed
in the design directly affects the system operation if an upset occurs on them, and
these critical bits can only be identified by fault-injection techniques. However, for
estimation, Xilinx allows generation of a mask file that identifies the essential bits of
the design, of which the critical bits are a subset [56].
Altera also offers a variety of SRAM-based FPGAs, such as the Stratix and Cy-
clone devices [2]. However, Altera FPGAs mostly rely on CRC-based error detection
and correction methodology for SEU mitigation [3]. If there was a means of estimat-
ing the number of essential bits and of enabling the periodic scrubbing technique, our
proposed methodology would apply directly on Altera SRAM-based FPGAs as well.
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2.3 Scrubbing
Data scrubbing is a well known technique for error correction. It uses a background
task that periodically inspects memory for errors and corrects the error using error-
correcting code memory or redundant copy of data. Scrubbing in Xilinx FPGAs use
an approach to scrubbing for configuration memory.
For most applications, the FPGA configuration data is loaded upon power-up.
In such applications, the desired state of the configuration memory that enables the
repair of upset bits through scrubbing will be known. For the implementation of the
scrubber, there are mainly two options. The first option is to implement the scrubber
as an external device, such as a radiation-hardened microprocessor. The other option
is to implement the scrubber internal to the FPGA using the fabric and ICAP [13].
External scrubbing with radiation-hardened parts is reliable. However, as it requires
at least one additional processor, it can be expensive in terms of power, size, and cost.
Even though internal scrubbing is superior with respect to these constraints, extra
care is required for implementing internal scrubbing as the scrubber itself is vulnerable
to SEUs. A scrubbing technique is a single algorithm used in the system to mitigate
configuration-memory upsets. There are two different types of techniques, specifically
detection techniques and correction techniques. Each of these techniques has its own
properties with respect to error coding, granularity and redundant data sources. A
scrubbing strategy is composed of at least one correction technique and optionally,
a detection technique. Blind scrubbing is a very popular scrubbing strategy with
no detection technique. If at least one detection technique is used in a scrubbing
strategy, then it is called read-back scrubbing. In read-back scrubbing, the current
state of configuration memory is read back from the device to detect an upset. For
this thesis, we concentrate on blind scrub, that does not require any detection.
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As discussed above, all scrubbing strategies employ at least one technique for
correcting the configuration bit upsets. Correction techniques either use data redun-
dancy to recall or calculate the original configuration and then write this configuration
to the device. These techniques differ in their coverage of various upset types (e.g.,
SBU vs. MBU), granularity of correction (e.g., frame vs. device) and correction
data source (e.g., off-chip vs. on-chip memory). Depending on the chosen scrubbing
strategy, the correction technique may be triggered continuously by a simple timer
delay, or by a detection technique. The golden copy correction and error syndrome
correction are the two main correction techniques that are widely used for scrubbing.
Error syndrome correction is mostly used in read-back scrubbing. In golden copy
correction, a trusted golden copy of the original configuration is kept off-chip in non-
volatile storage, such as a radiation-hardened PROM, and used to reconfigure the
FPGA as needed. Blind scrubbing strategies that employ only golden copy correction
are very popular in FPGA-based space platforms because of their effectiveness (they
can fix any number of upsets) and simplicity (less implementation complexity). These
strategies continuously or periodically reconfigure the FPGA with the golden copy to
repair errors quickly after they occur. A known limitation of blind scrub is that the
radiation-hardened memories may have limited bandwidth. As a result, the configu-
ration clock often can not be run at its maximum frequency. Scrubbing can be done
at a specified rate meaning that there might be a period of time between the moment
the upset occurs and the moment when it is repaired. That is why another form
of mitigation is required, such as a redundancy-based solution known as TMR [21].
TMR is a technique for enhancing the reliability, in which each module in a circuit
or the whole system is triplicated. A majority vote (two out of three) is taken on the
TMR outputs to determine the final module output.
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A scrub rate describes how often a scrub cycle should occur. It is denoted by
either a unit of time between scrubs, or a percentage (scrub cycle time divided by the
time between scrubs). There are direct relationships between scrub rate, design size,
design reliability and design safety, hence the scrub rate should be determined by the
expected upset rate of the device for the given application.
2.4 Dependability Metrics
The term dependability has quite a broad meaning that varies in the literature. In
1988, a survey [71] on several definitions of computer-based system dependability
resulted in this concise definition: “Dependability of a computer system may be defined
as justifiable confidence that it will perform specified actions or deliver specified results
in a trustworthy and timely manner”.
Similar to the definition, the number of dependability attributes also has several
options. According to [71], the attributes are : reliability, availability, performance,
integrity, robustness, serviceability, resilience, maintainability, testability, safety and
security. Some of the selected attributes will be discussed in the following as those
attributes will be analyzed using our proposed methodology.
2.4.1 Reliability
Reliability of a system (or component) is defined as the probability that the system
performs correctly for a given period of time, from zero (t0) to t1, given that the
system or the component was functioning correctly at t0. The reliability R(t) of a
single system/component (non-redundant) can be expressed as
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R(t) = e(−λt) (2.1)
where λ represents the failure rate of the component or the system, and t represents
the time period.
2.4.2 Availability
Availability is defined as the ratio of time the system or component operates correctly
(system uptime) to its entire mission time. For a simple system, if the Mean Time
Between Failure (MTBF) and the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) are known, then











Safety can be defined as a probability S(t), which represents that the system either
behaves correctly or will discontinue its function in a manner that causes no harm
(operational or fail-safe). The notion of coverage is very important to model safety
using Markov chain. The coverage is the measure of the system’s ability to reach a
fail-safe state after a fault. Modeling coverage and safety in Markov chain means that
every ‘unfailed’ state has two transitions, to a fail-safe and to a fail-unsafe state.
26
2.4.4 Performance
Performance can be considered as the sub-characteristics of dependability. Some of
the most common performance metrics are response time, throughput and resource
utilization. Throughput is a more popular metric than response time to compare the
performance of a system. According to ISO 9126-2, throughput describes the amount
of tasks that can be performed over a given period of time. Throughput can be mea-
sured in different ways, depending on the system and devices involved to handle the
task. For example, for a batch system, throughput is measured in job/sec. in contrast,
in interactive systems, request/sec is used.
2.4.5 Performability
Performability metric quantifies the system’s ability to perform in the presence of
faults [83]. It combines the performance and reliability of a fault tolerant system to
quantify the operational quality of the service between the failure (or an error) and
its recovery. The results of performability evaluation can be used as a supplement to
other metrics to assess the trustworthiness of a system. The concept of “performa-
bility” was first proposed in the mid-1970s, when system designers started dealing
with large and complex systems that need to maintain some degree of functionality
after a fault [64]. The field of fault-tolerant computing uses performability metrics
extensively to provide a composite measure of both performance and reliability over
the entire lifetime of a system [19]. The fault tolerant computing field frequently deals
with safety-critical and mission-critical systems for demanding environments such as
aerospace and high-performance transaction processing. Due to the high cost of devel-
oping and servicing of such systems, designers strive to model the behavior of such a
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system before they actually build it. Performability metrics provide a way to quantify
the behavior of such systems to gain more confidence in their design in early stage.
To get more familiar with the metric performability, consider a remote sensing
satellite (for weather forecasting) that is to be launched into orbit. The satellite con-
sists of a set of redundant components for its main crucial parts, such as high-definition
cameras, antennas and its power distribution system. Each of these component has
an associated failure rate over time, as well as a performance contribution. The
performance contribution of a component defines the degree to which the overall per-
formance of the satellite will be degraded upon the failure of that component. Given
these information, system designers can build an analytical model to determine the
average level of performance that the satellite can be expected to provide for part
or all of its operational lifetime. This metric, which might be a throughput mea-
surement, such as images transmitted per day (or any other number of specific tasks
completed per second/hour/day etc. ), is a performability metric because it captures
the system’s behavior given a failure (or fault) condition.
One way to measure the consequence of system’s performance degradation due
to a failure is to reward the system for every time unit it is ready to perform its task,
at a rate which is proportional to its performance during this interval. This can be
achieved by Markov Reward Model (MRM), which will be discussed in more detail
later in this thesis.
2.5 Probabilistic Model Checking and PRISM
Model checking [25] is a well established formal verification technique to verify the
correctness of finite-state systems. Given a formal model of the system to be verified
in terms of labelled state transitions and the properties to be verified in terms of
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Figure 2.3: Probabilistic Model Checking
temporal logic, the model checking algorithm exhaustively and automatically explores
all the possible states in a system to verify if the property is satisfiable or not [26]. If
not, a counterexample is generated. Probabilistic model checking deals with systems
that exhibit stochastic behaviour, such as fault-tolerant systems. Probabilistic model
checking is based on the construction and analysis of a probabilistic model of the
system, typically a Markov chain. In this thesis, we focus on the use of continuous-time
Markov chains (CTMCs) and Markov reward models [87], widely used for reliability
and performance analysis.
A CTMC comprises a set of states S and a transition rate matrix R : S × S →
R≥0. The rate R(s, s′) defines the delay before which a transition between states s
and s′ takes place. If R(s, s′) 6= 0 then the probability that a transition between
the states s and s′ might take place within time t can be defined as 1 − e−R(s,s′)×t.
No transitions will take place if R(s, s′) = 0. Exponentially distributed delays are
suitable for modelling component lifetimes and inter-arrival times.
29
In the model-checking approach to performance and dependability analysis, a
model of the system under consideration is required together with a desired property
or performance/dependability measure. In case of stochastic modelling, such models
are typically CTMCs, while properties are usually expressed in some form of extended
temporal logic such as Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [8], a stochastic variant of
the well-known Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [25]. PRISM [55] (as shown in Fig-
ure 2.3) is a well known tool for the formal modeling and verification of stochastic
systems, currently supports four types of probabilistic models: discrete-time Markov
chains (DTMCs), continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs), discrete-time Markov de-
cision processes (MDPs) and probabilistic timed automata (PTA). The specification
language for properties of the probabilistic models to be analysed in PRISM is based
on temporal logic, in particular PCTL and CSL that are probabilistic extensions of
the logic CTL. The principal operators are P, S and R which refer, respectively, to the
probability of an event occurring, the long-run probability of some condition being
satisfied and the expected value of the models costs or rewards. Below are given two
illustrative examples with their natural language translation in PRISM:
1. P = ? [ F [0, 600] failA ] - “The probability that component A fails within 10
minutes”.
2. P = ? [ G[0, 3600] !(failA|failB) ] - “The probability of no failures occurring in
the first hour”.
Additional properties can be specified by adding the notion of rewards. Each
state (and/or transition) of the model is assigned a real-valued reward, allowing
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queries such as:
R {“oper”} = ? [ C < T ] - “The expected cumulative operational time of the system
in the time interval [0, T]”.
Rewards can be used to specify a wide range of measures of interest, for example, the
number of correctly delivered packets or the time that the system is operational. Of
course, conversely, the rewards can be considered as costs, such as power consumption,




In safety-critical applications, dependability and performability of a design are prime
concerns since failures may have catastrophic consequences. This sets a need to an-
alyze different design options with different mitigation technique(s) for early design
decisions. In this chapter, we will discuss details of the design option analysis part
of our proposed methodology. Configuration scrubbing is often used in conjunction
with other forms of mitigation techniques such as TMR or spare components, to in-
crease reliability. However, cases where performability (reliability and performance
combined) is a major concern, redundancy-based solutions might not always be the
default choice [Bio-Cf5]. Moreover, setting always a target of perfect coverage is
expensive and unnecessary in most cases. That is why, it is crucial to evaluate the re-
lationship between reliability, availability, safety and performability with the adopted
fault mitigation technique(s), fault coverage and mission time. Such analysis at an
early design stage will allow designers to develop more reliable and efficient solutions,
and may also reduce the overall cost associated with the design effort. This part of
our work aims at achieving these goals.











Figure 3.1: A sample pseudocode and DFG representation
constructed using the Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG) of the system and a compo-
nent characterization library targeting FPGAs. The proposed model and exhaustive
analysis captures all the failure states, fault detection coverage and repairs possible
in the system within the radiation environment. In this chapter, we will also present
quantitative results based on an FIR filter circuit to illustrate the applicability of the
proposed approach.
3.1 CDFG and High-level Synthesis
In high-level synthesis, a behavioral description of a system is transformed into a
structural description comprising data path logic and control logic. High-level syn-
thesis algorithms read a high-level description and translate it into an intermediate
form. An intermediate form should represent all the necessary information and be
simple to be applicable in high-level synthesis. A Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG)
refers to such an intermediate form. At first, a behavioral description is converted into
a CDFG. The operations of the CDFG are then scheduled in clock cycles (scheduling),
a hardware module is assigned to each operation (module assignment), and registers
are assigned to input and output variables (register assignment). A Data Flow Graph
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(DFG), in which control information is omitted from a CDFG, is used frequently for
data path-intensive circuits (to which high-level synthesis applies) such as filters and
signal processing applications. They often do not require control of the data flow. In
Figure 3.1, a sample pseudocode (on the left) and its equivalent DFG representation
(on the right) are shown. There are control-intensive circuits in which control of the
data flow is required. The control data flow graph representation is used for such
circuits. Since our work mostly focuses on data path-intensive applications, we utilize
the information about the Data Flow (DFG) part of a CDFG. A formal definition of a
DFG can be given as: A DFG is a directed graph G = (V,E), where V = v1, v2, ..., vn
is a finite set whose elements are “nodes” and E = V ×V is an asymmetric “dataflow
relation”, whose elements are called “data edges”.
Scheduling is an important part of high-level synthesis. Scheduling can be de-
scribed as the process of dividing the CDFG (or DFG) into time steps that corresponds
to clock cycles at the Register-Transfer Level (RTL) level. A small example is shown
in Figure 3.1 that can be scheduled in two control steps (time steps) using two adders
and one multiplier. However, it can also be scheduled in three control steps using only
one adder and one multiplier. High-level synthesis algorithms such as forced-directed
list scheduling (FDLS) [73, 94] can generate different CDFGs depending on component
availability. FDLS is a well-established resource-constrained scheduling algorithm in
high-level synthesis of digital circuits that utilizes the strengths of the Force-Directed
Scheduling (FDS) and List Scheduling (LS). Force-Directed List Scheduling takes the
resource constraints and tries to optimize the latency of the design. FDLS is similar to
LS except for the force (measure of concurrency) used as a priority function. In brief,


















Figure 3.3: CDFGs scheduled over available resources
algorithm schedules operations until the resources become insufficient, and defers the
rest.
3.2 CDFG Rescheduling for Fault Recovery
Consider the CDFG of a synchronous dataflow DSP application shown in Figure 3.2.
Based on data dependencies, this application can be carried out in a minimum of three
control steps (csteps) using the CDFG-1 shown in Figure 3.3, with two adders and two
multipliers. Such implementation provides a throughput of 1/3 = 0.33 (for non-
pipelined systems, throughput is the inverse of latency [27, 11], throughput modeling
will be addressed later in this chapter). Another alternative consists of implementing
the application with only one multiplier and two adders but in four control steps, as
shown by CDFG-2 in Figure 3.3. In that case the throughput is 0.25. Based on the
priority of throughput or area metric, the appropriate CDFG can be selected.
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However, the inclusion of a reliability metric based on a fault recovery mecha-
nism can make the case more complex and difficult to evaluate. When a resource fails
(due to a configuration bit flip), an alternative schedule can be derived to continue
the system operation using the remaining resources, most likely at a lower through-
put. For example, to maximize the throughput, CDFG-1 is implemented. For a
single component failure, e.g. a multiplier, the application can be rescheduled to
implement CDFG-2 with lower throughput. For FPGA-based designs, such a fault
recovery technique can be adopted as well. We will explore the dependability and
performability-area tradeoffs for such systems. It is of interest that the controller
for rescheduling the operations is assumed to be fault-free. This controller can be
implemented in a separate chip, even in ASIC.
3.3 Methodology for design option analysis
In Figure 3.4, we present the detail of the design option analysis part of our proposed
methodology that starts from the control dataflow graph of the application. As men-
tioned in chapter 1, the CDFG is extracted using the free academic tool known as
GAUT [28]. It is worthy to mention that the boxes in the methodology represent
steps, and the edges show the relationship between them. The steps are as follows:
1. Configuration: As we already know, A CDFG can be implemented with different
component allocations (design options). To analyze each of these configurations, we
model them separately with the PRISM modeling language. From now on, we will
refer to the term design options as configurations in the rest of the chapter.





















Figure 3.4: Design option analysis methodology
terms of component failure rates, adopted fault mitigation strategy, fault coverage and
performance measures. To acquire the component failure rate, we use a characteriza-
tion library (characterization library is explained in section 4.4). The modeled fault
mitigation techniques are: rescheduling, cold spare components and blind scrubbing.
For rescheduling a CDFG, if possible with available components, a high-level synthesis
algorithm, such as forced-directed list scheduling [73] can be used. Since the model is
parametric, the fault coverage value and the scrub interval can be varied for analysis.
Each state of this Markov model can be augmented with associated rewards such as
throughput (obtained using high-level synthesis techniques: CDFG scheduling with
available components in each state), area (measured in terms of the total number of
LUTs required to implement the design, obtained from component characterization
library) or any other metric of interest. The resulting MRM is then analyzed using
the PRISM model checker tool.
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3. PRISM model checker: The PRISM tool then computes the set of all states which
are reachable from the initial state and identifies any deadlock states (i.e. reachable
states with no outgoing transitions). PRISM then parses one or more temporal logic
properties (e.g. in CSL) and performs model checking, determining whether the model
satisfies each property.
3.3.1 Markov Modeling of Reliability and Availability
CTMC models are very commonly used for modeling dependability of gracefully
degradable systems. Each state in a CTMC model representing a specific config-
uration, can be classified into different types depending on the number of healthy
components. For instance, the FIR filter in Figure 3.9 (quantitative results section)
requires at a minimum an adder and a multiplier for successful operation. Hence, any
state that does not fulfill the minimum resource availability is labeled as a failed state.
At the end, the state labeled as all fail represents a state where all the components in
the system have failed one-by-one due to SEUs. Note that safe and unsafe failures are
not considered at this stage of modeling. How to include safety in the model will be
described in detail in the next subsection. The initial state of a configuration has the
maximum throughput and all the components are functional. The edges between the
states represent transition rates. The assumptions for our model are defined as follows:
Assumption 1 : The components fail independently and the time-to-failure for a com-
ponent due to a configuration bit flip is exponentially distributed. Exponential distri-
bution is commonly used to model the reliability of systems where the failure rate is
constant. The scrub interval is assumed to follow an exponential distribution as well,
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with a rate, µ = 1/τ , where τ represents the scrub interval.
Assumption 2 : Every component in the system is connected with other components
(via multiplexers). This assumption is needed for simplicity of the hardware model.
The control unit can be designed as a finite state machine implemented either as a
hardwired or microcoded controller. Since in many systems, datapath components
dominate the area of the design compared to control units, these components can
be much more vulnerable to SEU than control units. Hence, we only consider the
failures of the datapath components in this work, and modeling of control units is left
for future works.
Assumption 3 : Only one component can fail at a time due to a SEU. This assumption
is made to ensure the complexity in the Markov model is manageable. The system
is assumed to be designed in such a way that each of its components can be easily
diagnosed.
Assumption 4 : Cold spare components are used to provide redundancy and are active
only when a same type of component fails. The cold spare components are only error
prone to cosmic radiations when they are active.
Assumption 5 : The reconfiguration and rescheduling times (i.e. the time taken for
the system to reschedule when a component fails and the time taken for repair via
scrubbing) are extremely small compared to the times between failures and repairs.
The time required for rescheduling is at most few clock cycles and the time required
for scrubbing is only a few milliseconds.
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Assumption 6 : All the states in the CTMC model can be classified into three types:
operational, where all the component are functional and the system has the highest
throughput; degraded, where at least one of the components is faulty; and failed,
where the number of remaining non-faulty components is not sufficient to perform
successful operation and hence has a throughput of 0. In PRISM, a formula can be
used to classify such states as shown in Figure 3.6.
Such a model is described as a number of modules in PRISM, each of which
corresponds to a component of the system. Each module has a set of finite-ranged
variables representing different types of resources. The domain of the variables rep-
resents the number of available components of a specific resource. The whole model
is constructed as the parallel composition of these modules. The behaviour of an
individual module is specified by a set of guarded commands. Once each module is
specified in such a manner, the PRISM model checker then performs a parallel compo-
sition of all the modules to build the complete Markov chain of the system specified.
A CTMC, as is the case here, can be represented in the following form in PRISM
modeling language:
[] <guard> → <rate> : <action> ;
The guard is a predicate over the variables of all the modules in the model. The
update comprises of rate and action. A rate is an expression which evaluates to a
positive real number. The term action describes a transition of the module in terms
of how its variables should be updated. The interpretation of the command is that if
the guard is satisfied, then the module can make the corresponding transition with






































Figure 3.5: Sample CTMC for reliability/availability analysis
might be:
[] <z = 0> → 7.5 : <z’ = z + 1> ;
which states that, if z is equal to 0, then it will be incremented by one and this
action occurs with rate 7.5. A second more significant example, is an application
that implements a function using 2 adders and 2 multipliers but that requires at least
1 adder and 1 multiplier (in case of failure due to SEU) for successful operation.
Such a configuration in the PRISM modeling language can be described as shown in
Figure 3.6.
In the PRISM code in Figure 3.6, num A and num M represent the number of adders and
multipliers available in the initial state of the configuration. The lambda A and the
lambda M variables represent the associated failure rates of the adders and multipliers
whereas miu represents the repair rate. Each repair transition (scrub) leads back to the
initial state reflecting the scenario that the configuration bit flips have been repaired.
The value of lambda A and lambda M is obtained from a component characterization
library, that will be explained later in this chapter. PRISM then constructs, from this,
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module adder
a : [0.. num_A] init num_A;
[] (a > 0) -> a*lambda_A : (a’ = a - 1);
[rep] (a < num_A) -> miu : (a’ = num_A);
endmodule
module mult
m : [0.. num_M] init num_M;
[] (m > 0) -> m*lambda_M : (m’ = m - 1);
[rep] (m < num_M) -> 1 : (m’ = num_M);
endmodule
formula fail = (a =0)|(m =0);
formula oper = (a=num_A)&(m=num_M);
formula degrade = !fail & !oper;
Figure 3.6: PRISM modeling for a system with 2-adders and 2-multipliers
the corresponding probabilistic model, in this case a CTMC. The resulting CTMC for
this configuration is shown in Figure 3.5 (lambda A, lambda M and miu are reflected
in the figure as λA, λM and µ respectively). The repair transition in the code is
synchronized with a label [rep] to demonstrate the phenomenon that when the FPGA
is scrubbed, all the components get fixed simultaneously. The formula fail, oper and
degrade classifies failed, operational and degraded states in the model.
3.3.2 Safety Modeling using Fault Coverage
Any fault detection algorithm can be assumed to detect and handle all the faults
properly. However, in reality this is not the case. A fault can escape the implemented
fault detection mechanism. As a result, the system will not be able to reschedule,
hence the system will be continuing its operation in a faulty mode. Which means,
each component in the configuration that implements the CDFG, can fail either in
a safe or in unsafe fashion. That is why we need to refine the model by taking into














Figure 3.7: Safety modeling of simple system with safe and unsafe failure
them as follows:
Definition 1: Safe failure could be when a component’s failure due to an SEU is prop-
erly detected, and handled by rescheduling depending on the number of remaining
components. If the rescheduling is not possible (number of available components are
less than the minimum number of components required for rescheduling), the system
will move to a fail safe state.
Definition 2: An Unsafe failure is the fail silent behavior, observed when a system
fails to detect a component’s failure.
If all the faults are safely detected, it will eventually lead to the failed safe state,
whereas even if there is a single fail unsafe occurrence, it will immediately lead to the
failed unsafe state. The error detection coverage of a component can be defined by a
conditional probability C :
C = P (fault detection|fault existence)
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Figure 3.7 shows the modeling of safety for a simple single component system with
only two adders including the repair transitions. For this case, we assume that the
system requires at least one adder for successful add operation. Initially the system is
in operational mode with two adders. When one adder fails, if the failure is detected,
the system is rescheduled and continues with only one adder. If the failure is not de-
tected, then it moves to the failed unsafe state. If another adder fails, the system will
not be able to continue its operations, hence it will fail safely. However, if this failure
is not detected, then the system will eventually fail in an unsafe fashion. Inclusion of
safety in the model requires the modification of assumption 6 as follows :
Assumption 6 : All the states in the CTMC model can be classified into four types:
1. operational - All the component are functional and the system has the highest
throughput.
2. degraded - At least one of the components is faulty.
3. failed safe - The number of remaining non-faulty components is not sufficient to
perform successful operation and hence has a throughput of 0. To reach failed safe
state, all the failures leading to this state must be fail safe.
4. failed unsafe - At least one failure is not detected by the detection algorithm. Fail
silent behavior of a component immediately leads to a failed unsafe state.
Figure 3.8 shows the modified PRISM code from Figure 3.6 after including the
coverage variable c in the model.
3.3.3 Peformability Modeling using MRM
When a system changes its state from one to another one due to a full/partial failure or
repair, the performance level can change. Such a scenario can be described by different
44
module adder
a : [0.. num_A +1] init num_A;
[] (a > 0 & (a < num_A +1)) -> c*a*lambda_A :
(a’=a-1) + a*(1-c)*lambda_A : (a’= num_A +1);
[rep] (a >= 0 ) -> repair : (a’=num_A);
endmodule
module mult
m : [0.. num_M +1] init num_M;
[] (m > 0 & (m < num_M +1)) -> c*m*lambda_M :
(m’=m-1) + m*(1-c)*lambda_M : (m’= num_M +1);
[rep] (m >= 0) -> 1 : (m’=num_M);
endmodule
formula fail_unsafe =((a=num_A +1)|(m=num_M +1));
formula fail_safe =((a=0)|(m=0))& !fail_unsafe;
formula oper =(a=num_A)&(m=num_M);
formula degrade =! fail_safe &! fail_unsafe &!oper;
Figure 3.8: PRISM modeling refined after inclusion of coverage (c) for a system with
2-adders and 2-multipliers
states using a Markov model that provides a framework for combined performance-
reliability (performability) analysis. Formally, an MRM consists of a CTMC X =
X(t), t > 0 with finite states space S, and a reward function r where r : S → R [79].
For each state i ∈ S, ri denotes the reward obtained per unit time spent by X in that
state which represents the the performance level given by the system while it is in
that state.
Performability measures can be distinguished in different classes, mainly into
two: steady-state performability and transient or point performability. For i ∈ S, let
wi denote the steady-state probability of residing in state i, and pi(t) the (transient)






wi ∗ ri (3.1)




pi(t) ∗ ri (3.2)
Markov Reward Modeling for the CDFG
For a data-flow system, the primary reward associated with each state of the MRM
is throughput. For a synchronous data-flow system, the throughput can be evaluated
directly from the CDFG of the system. As we consider only non-pipelined systems
in our work, we can define the throughput as the inverse of the number of seconds it
takes to execute the CDFG:
Throughput = (1/cstep) ∗ (cstep/cycle) ∗ (cycles/second) (3.3)
where, cstep is the control steps in the CDFG. Assuming that each cstep takes a single
clock cycle and η represents the system’s clock frequency (clock cycle/second):
Throughput = (1/cstep) ∗ η (3.4)
In our MRM, the operational and degraded states are augmented with asso-
ciated throughput reward, and all the failed states both safe and unsafe ones, are
augmented with a throughput reward of zero. The expected throughput (for long
run E[X] or for a specific mission time E[X(t)]) can be calculated using the equation
3.1 and equation 3.2 respecively. In our MRM model, the area that is required, to
implement the design on the FPGA, is assumed to be invariant between the states
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for a specific configuration. The reason is, once the system is implemented on FPGA,
the area is fixed (in terms of the total number of LUTs) and if a fault occurs, then
the system will be rescheduled or if it fails, then eventually will be scrubbed. So only
the control signals will change, not the components. For overall reward calculation
e.g. to evaluate the throughput-area-reliability trade-offs for a configuration, we use
the following equation:
Overall reward = (1/A) ∗ E[X] (3.5)
In the above equation, A represents the area of the design and E[X] represents the
expected throughput. This equation is similar to [52], however instead of calculating
the reward up to a specified time-step, we use the notion of steady-state throughput.
Such modeling can be considered as a direct optimization of throughput, area and
reliability. Rewards can be weighted based on designer’s requirements. For the case
study presented in this chapter, the rewards are set to equal weight.
3.3.4 Characterization Library
As the SEU rate λ is highly dependent on device process technology, architecture,
and orbits of interest, so this parameter is different for each device family. We use
CREME96 [92] with radiation cross sections from [77] to find per bit upset rate λbit
for Xilinx Virtex-5 in the Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) and Low Earth Orbit(LEO)
orbit. The failure rate for a component can be calculated using the equation as follows:
λcomponent = λbit ×Number of critical bits (3.6)
For our experiments, λbit = 7.31× 10−12 SEUs/bit/sec for the HEO orbit.
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Table 3.1: Characterization library
Component No. of No. of MTBF
LUTs essential bits (days)
Wallace Tree Multiplier 722 133503 11.85
Booth Multiplier 650 130781 12.11
Brant-Kung adder 120 29675 53.36
Kogge-Stone Adder 183 41499 38.15
In order to build a component characterization library that represents the first-
order estimation of the SEU effects on the components, we use the bitgen feature of
Xilinx ISE tool. Using the bitgen, we identified the essential bits which is also known
as potentially critical bits. Note that, it is well known that the number of critical bits
is less than the number of potentially critical bits. More accurate SEU susceptibility
analysis can be performed using the fault injection techniques [61, 50], however, for
first-order worst-case estimation, it is valid to assume that all the essential bits are
considered as critical bits. Note that we use the characterization library to obtain the
failure rate of the components for the Markov chain model and the methodology is
generic enough to be used with a different characterization library with more precise
and accurate data, without any major changes.
Table 3.1 presents a first-order worst-case estimate of component failures due
to SEUs. We characterize different adder and multiplier components, namely 64-
bit Brent-kung adder, 64-bit Kogge-stone adder, 32-bit Wallace-tree multiplier and
32-bit Booth multiplier. The Xilinx Synthesis Technology (XST) tool is used to
synthesize the components for Virtex-5 XC5VLX50T device from their HDL codes
and the number of required LUTs to implement them (area) is also obtained. We
observe that a 32-bit Wallace-tree multiplier has about 0.134 million bits that are
sensitive to SEUs. So this multiplier has a worst-case Mean Time Between Failures












Figure 3.9: CDFG of an FIR filter





3.4 Quantitative Analysis using PRISM
Filters are commonly used in digital communication systems for different purposes,
such as for equalization, signal separation, noise reduction and so on. Communication
is a fundamental issue for any space-borne applications ranging from satellites to
unmanned missions. That is why digital filters have an important role to play for
such systems [72]. FIR filters are one of two primary types of digital filters (the other
one is Infinite Impulse Response) used in Digital Signal Processing (DSP) applications.
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Table 3.2: Available design options to evaluate
Configuration Spare components Scrubbing Rescheduling
2A 2M None X X
2A 3M 1 Mul X X
3A 2M 1 Add X X
3A 3M 1 Add, 1 Mul X X
FIR filters are commonly used in spacecrafts for noise filtering from images, videos
and sensor outputs and spacecraft antennas [96, 34, 17]. To illustrate the applicability
of the proposed methodology for early design decision, this section presents a Finite
Impulse Response (FIR) filter case study [51] from the high-level synthesis benchmark
[12].
Figure 3.9 shows the CDFG for a 16-point FIR Filter [45] obtained from [66]. To
achieve a schedule with minimum number of control steps, the minimum allocation is
two adders and two multipliers for the FIR filter application. At a minimum a pair of
one adder and one multiplier is required for successful operation. For our experiments,
we consider the 32-bit Kogge-stone adders and 32-bit Wallace tree multipliers as avail-
able components from the characterization library, as they require less area (number
of LUTs) to implement. We must mention that any other adder or multiplier from
component the characterization library can be used for the similar analysis. The first
part of the case study presents the dependability analysis on different configurations.
The latter part of the case study focuses on the performability (throughput with re-
liability) analysis and overall reward calculation. Overall reward (equation 3.5) gives
the expected reward with both area and throughput taken into consideration.
Table 3.2 shows the different configurations to evaluate for FIR filter design and
the their respective fault mitigation strategy. The first configuration consists of two
adders and two multipliers with no redundancy. The second and third configuration
consist of one spare multiplier and one spare adder respectively used as redundant
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Table 3.3: Configurations vs classes of states
Config. I Operational Degraded Failure
(days) (days) (days) (days)
C1 1 2989.00 609.04 51.94
4 1937.53 1287.04 425.42
9 1222.40 1378.28 1049.31
C2 1 2989.00 642.82 18.14
4 1937.53 1492.61 219.86
9 1222.40 1711.59 716.00
C3 1 2989.00 613.08 47.91
4 1937.53 1319.58 392.88
9 1222.40 1441.09 986.50
C4 1 2989.00 647.06 13.93
4 1937.53 1531.90 180.55
9 1222.40 1795.97 631.61
components (coldspare). Configuration 4 is equipped with full component-level re-
dundancy, with a spare of each type of components. All the four configurations employ
scrubbing and rescheduling. In rest of the chapter, configuration 1, 2, 3 and 4 will be
referred as C1, C2, C3 and C4 respectively. Also for brevity when reporting exper-
imental results, the scrub interval and fault coverage will be denoted by I (in days)
and C respectively, and their units, when applicable, will be omitted.
In table 3.3, using reward-based properties, we analyze the number of days the
design spends in different classes of states for a mission time of 10 years and fault
coverage C = 0.99, with a value of I = 1, 4 and 9. Different states in the Markov
model can be classified into various classes using formulas in PRISM language. To
calculate the number of days spent in different classes of states, we define a reward
structure for each of them. For example, a reward structure degraded assigns a state
reward of 1 to all states of the model in which the system is in degraded mode. A
property that can reason about the amount of rewards accumulated over a period of
time, is represented using CSL logic in PRISM as follows:
51
Property 1: R{“degraded”} =?[C <= t] - “the expected cumulative time spent in the
degraded mode of the system in the time interval [0, t]”.
The first column of the table shows the different configurations for evaluation
and the second column shows the associated scrub intervals (I). The third, fourth,
and fifth column presents the number of days the design spends in different classes of
states. It is worth mentioning that the fifth column shows the days spent in either
failed safe or failed unsafe states. All the configurations spend approximately similar
number of days in operational state (rounded to 2 decimal points) for the same scrub
intervals. For I = 9, configuration C1 that has no redundant components shows
the worst result. Interestingly, we observe that adding an extra adder as spare does
not help much whereas adding an extra multiplier as spare significantly reduces the
number of days spent in failed states. In configuration C4, the added spares for both
adder and multiplier provide the best result in terms of availability. This is obvious
but will cost more area on the FPGA. Configuration C1 spends the least number of
days and configuration C4 spends the highest number of days in degraded states. For
many safety-critical applications, low performance for a period of time is acceptable.
For such systems the number of days spent in failed states is a major concern and
hence, configuration C4 and configuration C2 are the two best candidates.
Steady state analysis of a design is useful to evaluate its dependability in the
long-run. In Figure 3.10, we calculate the steady-state failure probability (safe or
unsafe) and compare the results of the four available configurations, with respect to
different scrub intervals (I is varied from 1 to 7) and same coverage (C = 0.99). The
steady-sate failure probability for a given configuration can be analyzed in PRISM
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Figure 3.10: Failure probability vs I (scrub interval)
using the following property:
Property 2: [S] = ? [ failedsafe + failedunsafe ] - “the long-run non-availability of
the system”.
The experimental results show that for configuration C1, the failure probability varies
from 0.014 to 0.288 depending on the value of I. Configuration C2 has a lower failure
probability than configuration C3 for all the scrub intervals. The failure probability
of configuration C4 for all different scrub rates shows the best result with associated
extra area overhead. From the results, we observe that configuration C2 is really an
attractive alternative to configuration C4 (even for I = 7, the probability varies by
only 0.023). On the other hand, configuration C1 and configuration C3 offer similar
results over the long-run. Another conclusion that can be added is, for a value of
I > 2 , the failure probability increases sharply for all the configurations. For a
value of I ≤ 2, configuration C1 and configuration C3, and, configuration C2 and
configuration C4 has almost same failure probability.
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show the effect of coverage C on reliability and
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Figure 3.11: Reliability vs I (scrub interval)
safety respectively, for different values of I, for a mission time of maximum 3 months
(T is varied from 1 to 90 days). For this part of the experiment (reliability and safety
analysis), we consider configuration C1 with two adders and two multipliers, however
any other configuration can also be analyzed in the similar fashion. The properties
used to analyze reliability and safety in PRISM are as follows:
Property 3 (Safety) : P = ? [ G [0, T ] operational | degraded |
failedsafe ] - “The probability that the system will be either in operational, degraded
or in failed safe state in first T days”.
Property 4 (Reliability) : P = ? [ G [0, T ] operational |
degraded ] - “The probability that the system will be either in operational or in de-
graded state in first T days”.
Figure 3.11 shows some interesting results for reliability evaluation. Configuration C1
has the highest reliability for I = 1 and C = 0.99. We observe that, with the same
coverage, for a delayed scrub of I = 4, configuration C1 has lower reliability than the
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Figure 3.12: Safety vs scrub I (scrub interval)
same configuration with I = 1 and C = 0.95. So, a high coverage does not by itself
guarantee a high reliability, particularly if the scrub interval is long. In contrast, if the
scrub interval is fixed, then increasing the coverage will always increase the reliability.
For example, the design with I = 4 and C = 0.99 has a higher reliability compared
with the design with I = 4 and C = 0.95. In Figure 3.12, we observe that, for C=0.99,
the safety of the system never goes below 0.83 in the first 3 months, even for the most
delayed scrub interval (I = 9). When we analyze the system for C = 0.95, it shows
how drastically the safety of the system falls. For C = 0.95, the safety of the system
drops up to 0.39 for a mission time of 3 months. It is also noticeable that if the value
of I increases, then the distance between the safety values also get wider even for the
same coverage.
Figure 3.13 reveals an important observation to compare the available design options.
We compare configuration C1 with no redundancy and configuration C4 with full
redundancy for three different values of coverage C and I = 1 (since the model is
parametric, any other parameter combinations can also be easily evaluated). We ob-
serve that, for perfect coverage (C = 1), indeed the configuration with redundancy
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Figure 3.13: Impact of C (coverage) on the design with/without redundancy for I =
1)
gives better reliability. However, for lower coverage values, such as C = 0.95, con-
figuration C4 with redundancy gives almost the same reliability compared to the
configuration C1 with no redundancy with perfect coverage. For even lower coverage
value, redundancy fails to improve the reliability compared to the configuration C1
for the cases where it has better coverage. This experiment shows that a design option
with redundancy is not always the best choice with lower coverage. For instance, all
C4 curves for which C < 0.95 produce a reliability less than C1 with C = 1. We redo
this experiment for a delayed scrub, I = 9 and plot the results in Figure 3.14. This
experiment shows that if a design option has coverage more that 0.85, then the design
option with redundancy provides a better reliability. From this, we can conclude that,
if a system employs longer scrub interval, then a design option with redundancy can
provide better reliability even with lower coverage, compared with the design option
with no redundancy, with same coverage. However, if the coverage goes lower beyond
a certain point, indeed redundancy will not help improving the reliability. Compari-
son of Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 also indicates that redundancy is more useful for
improving reliability in the cases where scrub interval is longer. For systems with
fast scrubbing capability, rescheduling can be a good alternative to redundancy-based
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Figure 3.14: Impact of C (coverage) on the design with/without redundancy for I =
9)
Figure 3.15: Impact of C (coverage) on for performability-area trade-off evaluation
for I = 1
solutions.
For performability and throughput-area analysis, Table 3.4 shows the expected
throughput and long-run overall reward calculation for various scrub intervals with C
= 0.99. The rewards are setup so that the area and expected throughput have equal
weights. Both the area and throughput were normalized between 0 and 1 in order
to not skew the reward numbers. For every configuration, the maximum throughput
(throughput in the initial state) is used to normalize the throughput for other states
in the Markov reward model. Similarly, the maximum area is used to normalize the
other area values among different configurations. In our model, a reward structure
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Table 3.4: Overall reward calculation
I Config. Normalized Area Norm. Overall
(days) Expected (No. of Area Reward
Throughput LUTs)
1 C1 0.955 1810 0.667 1.432
C2 0.974 2532 0.932 1.045
C3 0.973 1934 0.734 1.326
C4 0.993 2765 1.000 0.993
4 C1 0.811 1810 0.667 1.216
C2 0.876 2532 0.932 0.940
C3 0.856 1934 0.734 1.166
C4 0.931 2765 1.000 0.931
9 C1 0.628 1810 0.667 0.942
C2 0.717 2532 0.932 0.769
C3 0.684 1934 0.734 0.932
C4 0.790 2765 1.000 0.790
throughput assigns a normalized throughput reward to all the operational or degraded
states. All the failed safe and failed unsafe states are augmented with a throughput
reward of zero. Steady-state expected throughput (normalized) for a configuration
can be analyzed in PRISM using the property as follows and shown in column 3:
Property 5: R {“Expected throughput”} = ? [ S ] - “The expected throughput of
the system”.
Column 4 shows the area of each configuration and their normalized value is shown
in column 5. Column 6 shows the overall area-throughput reward (overall reward)
for each configuration. The reward for each configuration is calculated by multiplying
the value of column 2 with the reciprocal of the normalized area. Based on the equal
reward weighting, configuration C1 which has no redundancy (spare components),
shows the best throughput-area reward for all the values of I. This indicates that the
extra reliability provided by the redundancy is not always useful to suppress the extra
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Figure 3.16: Impact of C (coverage) on for performability-area trade-off evaluation
for I = 9
area overhead. However, rescheduling with scrubbing is good enough to serve as a fault
recovery and repair mechanism in such cases. Another important observation is that
adding a spare adder significantly improves the throughput-area reward, much more
than adding a spare multiplier. If performance is the main concern of the design, then
the expected throughput results from column 3 suggests configuration C4 as the best
choice to implement. It clearly shows, how the inclusion of throughput-area metrics
can influence design decisions toward solutions that differs from those resulting from
an analysis based on either dependability (as in Table 3.3) or performability metric
alone. Such an analysis, using the proposed methodology, can be very useful at early
design stages for designers of safety-critical applications concerned with dependability,
performance and area constraints.
To analyze the impact of coverage on performability-area trade-off, we evaluate
property 5 for scrub interval I = 1 and show the result in Figure 3.15. We find
that, from lower to higher coverage, the trend is the same, configuration C1 with no
redundancy keep dominating the overall reward graph. This supports the conclusion
derived from Table 3.4 that redundancy is not always useful to suppress the extra
area overhead for all coverage points. In contrast, when we redo this experiment for
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a comparatively delayed scrub I = 9, we clearly notice the relationship between I
and C reflected on the overall reward as shown in Figure 3.16. The configuration C1
with no redundancy is still dominating, but the rewards accumulated by configuration
C3 approaches closer to configuration C1 with increasing values of C. In contrast,
for lower coverage values, configuration C2 and configuration C4 accumulate almost
similar reward, however the gap between them expands with increasing values of C.
Such phenomena was not observed in Figure 3.15, but in Figure 3.16 it is visible for
delayed scrub interval.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we illustrated how available design options can be modeled using a
Markov (reward) model that captures the possible failures, fault detection coverage
and repairs possible in radiation environment. Afterwards, a wide range of properties
are exhaustively and automatically verified to evaluate the design options, in terms
of throughput, area and dependability. Such analysis is useful to reduce the overall
design cost and effort. The quantitative results from our obtained model shows some
important observations such as the fact that high coverage is not always helpful for
gaining high reliability, and that scrubbing delay has also a considerable impact.
In terms of safety, we also showed how scrubbing interval affects safety of available
design options with the same fault coverage. Our analysis also shows that redundancy
may fail to improve reliability if it has lower coverage compared to a design with
no redundancy but high coverage for some cases. For performability-area trade-off
analysis, we showed that redundancy-based solutions might not be always the best
choice as one may expect. Alternatively, for those cases, rescheduling in conjunction
with scrubbing can be a good option. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
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evaluate such relationships at early design stages using probabilistic model checking.
In the next chapter, we will explore how to model discrete time delays using
Erlang processes for modeling scrub intervals with better accuracy. At the same time,
we will also show in that chapter how the Design Assurance Level (DAL) compliance
can be checked at system level using our methodology.
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Chapter 4
Scrub Optimization and DAL
Analysis
The number and the complexity of electric components in commercial aircrafts have
grown dramatically. As a result, it became essential for the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) to establish a baseline of required design flow steps for an airborne
component. In 2005, DO-254 [65] was formally recognized as a standard to ensure
the highest level of safety in airborne electronic systems. It includes five levels of
compliance, commonly known as Design Assurance Levels (DALs). DALs range in
severity from A (means that a hardware failure would cause a catastrophic failure
of an aircraft) to E (means that a failure would not affect the safety). As expected
from the description, meeting a DAL-A level of compliance requires significantly more
effort and also greater attention to verification than would DAL-E. Figure 4.1 shows
the DALs as mentioned in DO-254.
For applications implemented in SRAM-based FPGAs, the most traditional way
of handing SEUs is to use TMR with scrubbing. We already know that implementing
a TMR in a design increases the power consumption by 300%. Also, we know that
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Figure 4.1: Design Assurance Levels
scrubbing a design less frequently increases the chances of accumulating SEUs in the
design that will eventually break the TMR. On the other hand, frequent scrubbing
consumes high power [67]. This indicates that a design should be scrubbed according
to its dependability requirements, not too frequently, specifically if the design has
strong power constraints like deep space missions.
In this chapter, we will explain the scrub optimization/DO-254 Analysis part
of our methodology. This part of the methodology focuses on the use of probabilistic
model checking technique for two purposes: (1) to analyze a reconfigurable system to
validate if the design meets the assurance level (DAL) and also the high-availability
requirements. (2) to explore the effects of the scrub interval on the design (modeled
using Erlang process) to suggest the lowest possible scrub frequency to meet the avail-




A system exposed to a harsh radiation environment will eventually fail, requiring re-
pair or replacement. Hence, it is important to have a model that can represent main-
tenance effects on a system’s condition as well as the deterioration process. However,
many systems subject to maintenance and degradation may involve state transitions,
which depend explicitly on time, or occur discretely. For these reasons, maintenance
actions cannot generally be modeled by a simple exponential distribution within the
Markov process. For example, a significant repair or periodic inspection time, which
may reflect realistic maintenance activities, does not generally follow the exponen-
tial distribution. Therefore, we have to develop an approximation methodology to
allow the Markov processes to model significant holding times. In our modeling,
the deterministic repair intervals are modeled using the Erlang process [30] for bet-
ter accuracy. Using Erlang process a nonexponential holding time distributions can
be approximated by inserting multiple intermediate states between every main state
pairs.
Erlang distribution is (a special case of a phase-type distribution [70]) the most
suitable phase approximation for the deterministic distributions since this is the least
variable phase type distribution for any given number of phases [30]. A random
variable X has an Erlang-k (k is the number of phases, k = 1, 2, ...) distribution
with mean k/µ if X is the sum of k independent random variables X1, ..., Xk having
a common exponential distribution with mean 1/µ (µ is the scale parameter, also can
be written as the inverse of rate parameter 1/λ). The probability density function





























Figure 4.2: Scrub optimization/DAL analysis methodology
PRISM model checker is based on the use of classical Markov chain. Hence, the
transition delay between a pair of states is exponentially distributed. Since configura-
tion scrubbing is executed periodically after a fixed interval, to model this phenomenon
approximation of discrete time delay is required. In this chapter while discussing the
modeling, we will demonstrate how we use Erlang distribution in our modeling to
achieve this goal.
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4.2 Scrub optimization/DAL Analysis Methodol-
ogy
In Figure 4.2, we present the methodology for scrub optimization and DAL analysis.
We start from the dataflow graph of the application. Once the CDFG is extracted,
a resource estimation process is used to estimate the resource required for the ap-
plication. Resources estimation is based on the extracted CDFG. For this step, we
analyze each of the nodes in the graph to compute resources required to implement
an application on a specific FPGA target platform. A PRISM model is then built to
analyze the design and this model is configured using environmental, target system
and mitigation parameters. Different reliability and availability properties are then
verified to check if the design meets the reliability and availability requirements. The
different steps of the methodology are explained as follows.
4.2.1 Resource Estimation
The resource estimation procedure is inspired from [90], and based upon the concept
of primitives, which represent elementary functions (e.g. addition, multiplication)
used in target applications. The primitives can be divided in two types: 1) the func-
tional primitives, which are the basic operations as they appear in the C/C++ code
and the CDFG, and 2) the structural primitives, which are the hardware counterparts
of the functional primitives appearing in the target FPGA. Based on these, the esti-
mation procedure simply becomes identifying functional primitives in the CDFG and
matching them with structural primitives, which appear in the target characterization
library.
Estimated resources also depend on the style of application of the design. For
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S0 S1 S2λ1 λ2
Figure 4.3: A simple Markov chain to illustrate failure occurrence
example, a full parallel application of a CDFG will require maximum number of
resources with maximum speedup. However, depending on area, performance and
power requirement, the CDFG might require scheduling to deal with the constraints.
Depending on the required resources, using a characterization library (explained in
the previous chapter), the number of essential bits is estimated for the design. The
number of essential (potentially critical) bits is important for calculating the Markov
model parameters.
4.2.2 Markov Modeling of Failure and Deterministic Delay
It is known that the probability of a state transition for a classic Markov model is
assumed to depend only on the current state. This is equivalent to assuming that
failure rates are constant and that failure occurrence is a Poisson process. Since SEU
rates are usually modeled using a Poisson process [18], that implies that the time
between two consecutive events is exponentially distributed.
module adder
s : [0..2] init 0;
[] (s = 0) -> lambda_1 : (s’ = s + 1);




Figure 4.4: State probabilities vs time
Lets assume that we have a system with error detection capability. The Markov
model of such a system as shown in Figure 4.3, can be built with three discrete states
(S0: fully operational, S1: faulty but with fault undetected, and S2: fault detected,
failed) representing the system’s status. However, the number of states can be easily
changed, depending on the degree of model specificity. The failure rates λ1 and λ2
are constant between states. This system can be described using PRISM modeling
language as shown in the sample PRISM code.
For the sample Markov chain in Figure 4.3, if λ1 = 0.010 and λ2 = 0.005, then the
corresponding state probabilities, and reliability function of that Markov degradation
model can be generated using PRISM as displayed in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. The
reliability function is calculated by summing up all the state probabilities except that
of the failed state, S2. In this example, the system is considered tolerant to only
one fault. Conversely, a Markov process can also be derived to approximate a given
reliability function.
As mentioned earlier, we use the concept of a phase-type distribution to approx-
imate a time delay until absorption to one of the states in the Markov chain. It is also
known that the Erlang process (i.e., summation of identical exponential distributions
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Figure 4.5: Reliability vs time
S0 S1 S2 Sm-1 Smm/τ m/τ m/τ
Figure 4.6: Markov chain for Erlang process
as displayed in Figure 4.6) minimizes the variance among any phase-type distributions
[30]. In other words, non-exponential holding time distributions can be approximated
by inserting multiple intermediate states between the two conventional degradation
states. For illustration, in Figure 4.6, τ is the total transition interval between S0 and
Sm, and m− 1 is the number of intermediate stages used to approximate it. The rate
at which transitions happen is proportional to m to provide a same total transition
time. This Erlang process approximation of a constant time delay in a Markov pro-
cess enables the incorporation of various maintenance activities into the equipment
deterioration model.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the results of implementing the Markov chain of Figure 4.6
to approximate a constant delay of 10 hours. The figure shows the probability distri-
bution of delay times for different values of m. This is how we implement constant time
delay for modeling of periodic repair while preserving the Markov property. There is
a clear and obvious trade-off here between the accuracy (how close it is to modelling
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Figure 4.7: Deterministic delay modeling with Erlang process
a deterministic time delay) and the resulting expansion in the size of the model.
4.2.3 Modeling Scrub and TMR
A system that utilizes the periodic blind scrub mitigation technique can be modeled
as a Markov model as illustrated in Figure 4.8. Here the states represent:
S0i : The system is fully operational (1 < i < m);
S1i : The system is faulty with one or more faults (1 < i < m);
In this model, λdesign represents the failure rate of the design and µ represent
the repair rate, where µ = m/τ , τ = scrub interval. The Markov process is created
by stacking the Erlang processes (shown in Figure 4.6) on top of the failure model
(with 2 main states) shown in Figure 4.3. The conceptual block diagram of TMR
using device-level redundancy is shown in Figure 4.9. Three implementations of the
design (known as Functional units or FUs) are used in parallel, and their output goes
to a majority voter circuit (the majority voter circuit is assumed to be fault free).


















Figure 4.8: Markov model of periodic blind scrub using Erlang process
encounter errors, then the TMR strategy may fail, since the erroneous output can
propagate. The Markov model of a system implementing both TMR and scrub is
shown in Figure 4.10. This is an extension of the previous scrub only model. The
states represent:
S0i : The system is fully operational, e.g. All 3 FUs are fault free. (1 < i < m);
S1i : One of the FUs has encountered at least one SEU and thus the system is under
fault, but the output is not erroneous. The system is in a degraded mode (1 < i < m);
S2i : Two of the FUs are faulty, caused by one or more SEUs in each FU, and hence








Figure 4.9: Conceptual TMR model
stay there until the next scrub arrives (1 < i < m);
4.2.4 Markov Model Parameters
Once the Markov model is built, we need to populate the model for further analy-
sis. Three different types of parameters are required [62], namely (1) Environmental
parameters, (2) Target system parameters and (3) Mitigation parameters. Some of
these parameters, such as mitigation parameters, can be varied freely to achieve op-
timal availability. On the other hand, target system parameters and environmental
parameters are fixed for a given target system and environment.
Environmental parameters
The key environmental parameter is the upset rate λ experienced in various orbits
of interest. As the observed upset rates are dependent on device process technology
and architecture, so this parameter may be different for each device family. We use

































Figure 4.10: Markov model of TMR with periodic blind scrub using the Erlang process
for Xilinx Vitex-5 in ISS LEO orbit, which is 2.63× 10−12 SEUs/bit/sec. The failure
rate for this system can be calculated as follows:
λdesign = λbit ×Number of critical bits (4.2)
The number of critical bits is the summation of the critical bits from the required
resources estimated by the resource estimation process.
Target system parameters
The target system can be defined with three main parameters, namely SelectMAP
bus width (B) and the configuration clock frequency (fclk). Usually, these param-
eters are set by the system designer and also limited by the system architecture.
They directly impact system availability. We assume a conservative system using a
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Table 4.1: Model construction time and statistics
m
No. of states No. of transitions Time (s)
Scrub Scrub & Scrub Scrub & Scrub Scrub &
only TMR only TMR only TMR
50 100 150 150 300 0.006 0.006
100 200 300 300 600 0.008 0.009
200 400 600 600 1200 0.015 0.018
radiation-hardened memory with an 8-bit bus at 33MHz.
Mitigation parameters
For a system using periodic scrub, mitigation parameters µdesign describes the scrub
rate of the system and it can be calculated using the target system parameters. Scrub
rate can be determined experimentally, however this rate also can be estimated ana-





We use this equation to calculate the repair rate parameter µ in our model, where
µ = m× µdesign.
For the purpose of parameter calculation in our case study, we consider the
Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VLX330 device as the target which has 79,704,832 configuration
bits and ISS LEO orbit as the target orbit. Similarly, any other target device or any
other orbit can be evaluated using the same methodology.
4.3 Case Study
For the case study, we consider a 512-tap parallel FIR filter for space application.
Using the methodology described in [90], from high-level design description, the data
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16-tap FIR2 16-tap FIR3
Figure 4.11: 512-tap parallel FIR filter
flow graph representation is obtained and the number of essential bits for FPGA
implementation is estimated. In our experiments, we consider a worst-case scenario,
where all the essential bits are considered critical bits. Figure 4.11 shows the block
diagram of a 512-tap parallel FIR filter using 32 blocks, each of which embedding
a 16-tap FIR filter. The number of essential bits required to implement this design
is approximately 5863557 bits. Table 4.1 shows the model generation statistics and
timings for different values of m (number of Erlang steps). For our experiments, we
choose the value: m = 200.
The experimental results can be divided into two different sections: Analysis and
Verification. In the analysis section, we show the use of probabilistic model checking
to analyze the system and to evaluate its reliability and availability properties. In the
verification section, we show how such analysis can be used to verify that the system
meets its DAL and availability requirements.
75
4.3.1 Analysis
The scrub parameter µ is the reciprocal to the time needed to repair an upset once
the scrub technique is triggered. From mitigation parameter calculation, we find that
µdesign = 3.19/sec, which implies that it requires approximately 300ms to repair an
upset. One may intuitively conclude that scrubbing continuously is the best solution
to ensure the best availability. However, one of the main drawbacks of this technique
is its high power consumption, due to the repeated accesses to the large configura-
tion memory of the FPGA [67]. Thus, it is desirable to perform scrubbing with the
minimum required frequency.
In Figure 4.12, we show the availability for different scrub intervals (τ) for a
mission time of T = 300 seconds. In PRISM, this property can be formalized as
R{"up time"} = ? [C <= T]/T, T = 1 to 300. Regarding the scrub parameter
µ, there are two main things to consider in scrubbing: time when the scrub is trig-
gered and time to repair the bitstreams. For the following experiments, whenever
we mention scrub interval, it includes both the time to trigger the scrub and time to
repair the bits. We observe that, for τ = 0.5 seconds, the availability is decreasing
but stays in the range of five 9s (99.999%) for the whole mission time. On the other
hand, for τ = 1 second, the availability drops below five 9s before reaching T = 50 and
continues in the range of four 9s. For τ = 1.5 second and 2 seconds, the availability
is in the range of four 9s and decreases with time.
In Table 4.2, we show the availability of the system for a mission time of one
month for different scrub intervals, τ . We observe that the availability is five 9s for τ
= 0.5 second and four 9s for τ = 5 seconds, and for τ = 1000 seconds the availability
is only two 9s. The probability that the system will always be operational (with
zero failure events) within the first 2 hours of operation can be formalized in PRISM
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Table 4.2: Scrub intervals vs reliability and availability
Scrub Interval (s) Availability Reliability with Reliability with scrub
(1 month) scrub, T = 2 hr & TMR, T = 2 hr
0.5 0.99999 0.8658 0.9999
5.0 0.99995 0.8658 0.9999
10.0 0.99989 0.8658 0.9999
100.0 0.99899 0.8658 0.9991
1000.0 0.99001 0.8658 0.9918
Figure 4.12: Availability for T = 300s
as : P = ? [G[0, T] ("operational")], T = 7200, and the results are shown
in Table 4.2. Reliability results show that periodic scrubbing has no effect on the
reliability. This might seem counter intuitive as one might think that the scrub will
drastically increase the reliability. In fact, this result reflects the memoryless property
of exponential distributions. When an SEU occurs, it might corrupt the system, but
if the impact has not arrived yet, the observed time can be reset at any time, that
means the coming time of the impact will not be delayed by periodic scrubbing. That
is the main reason why the periodic scrubbing will not increase reliability. Availability
is defined as the ratio of uptime and total runtime (mission time). That is why, for
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repairable systems, system engineers are more interested in availability analysis. The
results also show that even though the reliability is not increased, the availability
is significantly improved by the scrubbing. To increase the reliability, the designers
need to adopt redundancy-based solutions, such as device-level TMR at a cost of at
least 3 times area and power overhead, and the results are shown in column 4. The
results show how significant reliability improvements are obtained by adopting the
TMR-based solution with scrub. We must mention that in such cases, periodic scrub
will have an effect on reliability. The reason is, to reach a failure state, it needs at
least 2 FU failures (assuming the voter is error free). So after one FU fails, if the scrub
interval is short, the system gets back to “all good” state before the second failure
occurs. Otherwise, if the wait time is longer for the second scrub, then it might reach
the failure state before the scrub is triggered. For example, for a scrub interval of
1000 seconds, we observe that the reliability drops to 0.99.
Such analysis at an early design stage can help a designer to adopt a proper
mitigation strategy considering reliability, availability requirement, power and area
constraints. For high availability applications, scrubbing alone might fulfill the re-
quirements. Using our methodology, the designer can choose a proper scrub interval
to minimize the power requirements for such applications. On the other hand, for
reliability oriented applications, a redundancy-based solution is a must. However, it
comes with an extra power and area overhead. The area and power overhead can be
reduced by applying the other types of TMRs, such as selective TMR [80], however
device-level TMR ensures the best reliability [35].
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Table 4.3: Verification of availability requirements
















Depending on the mission goal, a spacecraft can have different levels of reliability and
availability requirements. For example, a GPS or communication satellite will need a
better availability compared to an earth observation satellite. A Mars rover’s landing
module will require better reliability than the module responsible for taking photos
periodically to send back to earth. Finite Impulse Response (FIR) and Elliptic Wave
Filter (EWF) filters are widely used in image processing applications and also for sen-
sor’s noise reduction. Autonomous landing systems [63] widely use image processing
algorithms to find a suitable landing place, hence it is obvious that such a system
will require high reliability as the choice of wrong landing place may cause mission
failure. We consider a 512-FIR filter for two different applications: in GPS satellites
and in a lunar landing module. For the first part of the analysis, we will also analyze
a parallel EWF filter structure that has 32 blocks running in parallel, each of which
has a separate 16-point Elliptic wave filter [66]. Communication satellites require
high availability, usually in the range of five 9s. To be independent of mission time,









Figure 4.13: Fault tree of the system
that level of service in a long run. So we need to find, “for a given scrub rate, does
the system meet the requirement for five 9s ?”. Such property can be formalized in
PRISM as S >= 0.99999[“operational”]. To find the appropriate scrub rate, we vary
the scrub interval from 0.5 to 3 seconds and verify if the requirement is met. The
results are shown in Table 4.3. As we can see from the results, the only scrub interval
that meets the requirement for the FIR filter is τ = 0.5 second or less. In contrast,
for EWF filter application, the scrub interval can be further delayed up to 1 second.
To verify the DAL requirement, we consider a hypothetical system that uses the
FIR filter as a subcomponent in the image processing component of a lunar landing
module. As such image analysis needs to be done in real time and a fault during the
landing operation will cause a catastrophic failure, so the overall failure probability
of such a system must be less than 10−9 (DAL-A design) according to Item Design
Assurance Level (IDAL) standard. From the fault tree [10] in Figure 4.13, we observe
that if any of the subcomponents, namely A, B and the FIR filter fails, the module
fails. If subcomponent A and subcomponent B both have a failure probability of
0.0001, then to avoid a catastrophic failure the failure probability of the FIR filter
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Table 4.4: Verification of reliability requirements
Scrub interval DAL-A met DAL-A met DAL-A met
(seconds) (scrub only) (scrub only) (scrub & TMR)
(B = 0.0001) (B = 0.001) (B = 0.001)
0.5 True False True
1.0 True False True
1.5 True False True
2.0 True False True
2.5 True False True
3.0 True False True
must be less than 0.1. It takes around 4 days to reach lunar orbit and touchdown to the
moon requires around 11 minutes starting from the descending time. So to be safe, we
consider 20 minutes, hence we find out “For a given scrub interval, what is probability
that the FIR filter will fail in last 20 minutes of the flight ? ”. Such property can
be formalized in PRISM as P < 0.1 [F [344400,345600] ("failure")]. We also
evaluate another case, where the failure probability of subcomponent B is 0.001. For
this experiment, a system with only scrub and a system with both TMR and scrub,
are evaluated while varying the scrub rates (as scrub rate affects the system using
TMR with scrub). From the result shown in Table 4.4, we observe that, all the scrub
intervals from 1 to 3 seconds meet the DAL-A requirement, whereas in the latter
case, if B = 0.001, then it fails to satisfy the DAL-A requirement. However, if TMR is
adopted with scrub, even with B = 0.001, the system meets the DAL-A requirement
for all the scrub intervals. Such results can help a designer obtain the maximum scrub
interval (in this case 3 seconds) to save power.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented a part of our proposed methodology that focuses on the
optimization of scrub frequency and verification of DAL compliance. We presented
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the reliability and availability models for systems with periodic scrub and TMR de-
veloped using conventional Markov chains (instead of semi-Markov). Our analysis
using PRISM model checker showed how an appropriate scrub interval (slowest scrub
rate) can be found to save power while meeting the dependability requirements. In
addition, it was also showed that probabilistic model checking based techniques can
be used to verify the high-availability, and the DAL compliance requirements at a
high-level. In the next chapter we will explain the last part of our methodology that
enables the early analysis of TMR partitioning strategy for optimal partitioning.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Partitioning of TMR
Reliability analysis of TMR and related improvements have been studied for a long
time and widely reported in many literatures. Compared to that, partitioning of TMR
for reliability improvement got less attention from the research community. In this
chapter, we illustrate the third part of our methodology that can be utilized to assess
the TMR partitioning scheme at early design stages. This part of our work aims
to analyze the relationship between the number of TMR partitions, scrub interval
and mission time. The proposed formal models of TMR partitioning can handle both
equal sized or non-equal sized partitions. In addition, our proposed model can analyze
designs capturing both the phenomena, SBUs and MBUs (we assess up to Double Bit
Upsets (DBUs)). Note that, multiple bit upsets in different components from a single
strike can be classified as Multi-Cell Upsets (MCUs). MCU refers to the flipping
of two or more number of bits in the memory array due to one or more radiation
particles. However, to be more generic in the rest of this chapter, we will address
MCUs as MBUs. The proposed modeling technique is useful to find: (1) the trade-off
between the number of partitions and required scrub rate (and vice versa) to meet
the target reliability and availability, (2) the optimal number of partitions for designs
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Figure 5.1: Sample unmitigated circuit
prone to both SBUs and DBUs.
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Figure 5.2: TMRed version of the sample circuit
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Figure 5.3: The sample circuit with TMR divided into two partitions
5.1 TMR Partitioning
Traditional TMRed design can deal with a single fault at a time. Thus, faults in
multiple redundant modules will break the TMR. For illustration, Figure 5.1 shows
84
a sample circuit (each box represents a module) and Figure 5.2 shows the TMR
implementation of the sample circuit in the traditional way. While designing a system
with traditional TMR, the components are triplicated and a majority voter is placed
at the output of the circuit. The voter can provide correct outputs even if one of
the branches (or domains) of the TMR is faulty. Figure 5.3 shows the same system
implemented with partitioned TMR (as suggested in [75]). In terms of dependability,
each partition can be considered as a separate entity. This circuit will only fail if two
or more domains in the same partition are affected by one or more faults. For example,
upsets in module m2 in domain two (second row) and m3 in domain one (first row)
will break a traditional TMR system, whereas it will get successfully masked in a
system with partitioned TMR.
5.2 Methodology for TMR partitioning analysis
Figure 5.4 presents the proposed methodology. Once the CDFG is extracted, depend-
ing on the resource, performance or area constraint for hardware implementation, it
can be scheduled using the appropriate scheduling algorithm. Since, scheduling is out
of the scope of this work, we assume a fully parallel implementation of the CDFG for
high performance. However, it is worth mentioning that, the methodology will work
irrespective of the scheduling approach. Depending on the number and size of par-
titions defined by the user, each domain in each partition can be represented as one
or a collection of nodes (nodes in the graph represent a basic operation such as add,
multiply, etc.). Each node can be implemented as a component in the FPGA. We use
the component characterization library to estimate the failure rate of each component
as mentioned in the earlier chapters. With this approach, the failure rate calculation





























Figure 5.4: Methodology for optimal TMR partitioning
a specific partition is equal to the total failure rate of the components in that domain.
Based on the calculated failure rate of each domain, the number of partitions and the
user defined scrub rate, a PRISM model is then built. The PRISM model checker
then automatically converts the PRISM model to an equivalent CTMC representation.
Different reliability and availability properties are then verified to check if the design
meets the requirements. The PRISM model checker provides quantitative results. If
the requirements are not met, the number of partitions or the scrub frequency is then
modified, and the analysis is performed again.
For illustration, in Figure 5.5 the partitioning of a CDFG representing an 8-tap
FIR filter is shown. All the domains in partition-1 have four multipliers and three
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adders. On the other hand, each of the domains that are part of partition-2 contains
four multipliers and four adders. Note that we use the same characterization library
that was introduced in chapter 3 to calculate the failure rate of the TMR domains. The
proposed methodology is generic enough to be used with a different characterization
library with more precise and accurate data, without any major changes. The failure
rate for a component can be calculated using the following equation :
λcomponent = λbit ×Number of critical bits
For our experiments, λbit = 7.31 × 10−12 SEUs/bit/sec for Higher Earth Orbit. So,
the failure rate of a single domain in partition-1 is the summation of total failure
rate from 4 multipliers and 3 adders. The failure rate of partition-1 is then just the
failure rate of a domain in partition-1 multiplied by 3. It is important to mention
that an SEE can cause either an SBU or MBU. Hence, λdomain need to be adjusted
accordingly. The simplest way is to multiply the λdomain with the SBU and MBU
coefficient, αSBU and αMBU respectively.
5.2.1 Markov Modeling of Single Bit Upsets (SBUs)
Before modeling the TMR partitions, we describe the traditional CTMC model of a
TMR system with scrubbing (no partition) that is shown in Figure 5.6. Each node in
the model denotes the current state of the system: state 3 represents the state in which
all domains are operating correctly (all the modules are fault-free), state 2 represents
a state where one out of three domains is operating incorrectly (in one of the domains
at least one of the modules is faulty), but the output is still not erroneous, and state 1
represent a failure state in which two or more domains are operating incorrectly (more
than one module is faulty in two or more domains). The failure rate λ represents the



























































































Figure 5.5: TMR implementation of the CDFG of an 8-tap FIR filter with two par-
titions
domains in TMR have an equal failure rate, the transition rate from state 3 to state
2 can be depicted by 3λ (the sum of failure rates of each of the individual domains).
As a first step in our modeling, we modify the TMR Markov model presented
in [75] by adding some extra (self) transitions to represent some possible scenarios.
Since we consider periodic blind scrub, so from state 3 the system can either go to
state 2, or get scrubbed with a defined scrub rate. The scrub transition in state 3
is represented by a self-transition with a rate µ. From state 2, the system has three
options: (1) the system can get scrubbed and go back to state 3; (2) another module
in a fault-free domain of the TMR can fail — which will lead the system to state
1 with a transition rate 2λ or (3) SEUs (causing an SBU) can hit the same module
or another module in the same domain that failed earlier, in which case, the system
will stay in the same state with a transition rate λ. Once the system enters the state
3, which is a failed state, it will remain in that state until the system gets scrubbed
eventually and comes back to state 3 with the scrub rate µ. The assumptions for the
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Figure 5.6: Markov model of TMR with repair
model can be defined as follows:
Assumption 1 : Each module(components) in the TMR may fail independently. Since
the modules in a domain are non-redundant, so a module failure represents the failure
of the respective domain. The time-to-failure due to a configuration bit flip (either
SBU or DBU) is exponentially distributed. The exponential distribution is commonly
used to model the reliability of systems where the failure rate is constant. The scrub
interval is assumed to follow an exponential distribution as well, with a rate, µ = 1/τ ,
where τ represents the scrub interval.
Assumption 2 : The design employs the blind scrubbing technique.
Assumption 3 : Only one module can fail at a time due to an SBU.
Assumption 4 : The majority voters in TMR are assumed to be error free.
Assumption 5 : All the states in the CTMC model can be classified into two types:
operational, where at most one or no domain in any of the partitions are faulty; and
failed, which means there is at least one partition, where more than one domain is
faulty. In PRISM, a formula can be used to classify such states.
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Before we go to the second step of modeling, we formalize the Markov model
of the TMR in Figure 5.6. As mentioned earlier, we consider a CTMC as a finite
transition system (S,R, L). The set of states can be denoted by S = {3, 2, 1}. In
state i ∈ S, i represents the number of domains that are healthy. The rate matrix
R is depicted on the edges, for example, R(3, 2) = 3λ, R(2, 1) = 2λ, R(2, 2) = λ,
R(2, 3) = µ, R(3, 3) = µ and R(1, 3) = µ. Let the atomic propositions up and down
denote that the system works correctly or not respectively. Since it is a TMR system,
2 out of 3 domains need to be working at a time. Then, L(3) = L(2) = up, i.e., the
states 3 and 2 satisfy the atomic proposition up. Similarly, L(1) = down, i.e., the
states 1 satisfy the atomic proposition down.
In our modeling, each TMR partition is modeled as a separate CTMC. This
means that each of the partitions has a separate CTMC that is equivalent to the
model shown in Figure 5.6. Hence, a system with N partitions can be defined by a
set:
P = {P0, P1, ...., PN}
Here each Pi ∈ P represents a CTMC. If the system is divided into N partitions, then
its final model is defined by the parallel composition (‖) of all the CTMCs from the
partitions:
M = {P0 ‖ P1 ‖ .... ‖ PN}
The total state space of the model M will be the cross product of states in all the
partitions. The PRISM code for two partitions is shown in Figure 5.7. Each module
in the PRISM code represents a partition in the TMR. num P1 M and num P2 M define
the number of domains in each partition. In TMR the number of domains is 3,
so both of these parameters need to be initialized with a value of 3. Lambda P1
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1 module Partition -1
2 P1 : [1.. num_P1_M] init num_P1_M;
3 // num_P1_M = 3 means all modules working fine , num_P1_M =
2 means one of the module is faulty , num_P1_M means TMR
failed
4 [] (P1 > 1) -> P1*lambda_P1 : (P1 ’=P1 -1);
5 // failure of a modules due to SBU
6 [] (P1 = 2) -> lambda_P1 : (P1 ’= 2);
7 // the same module that already failed can fail again
8 [dbu] (P1 > 1) -> (P1*lambda_P1D+P2*lambda_P2D) : (P1 ’=P1
-1);
9 // failure of a modules in either partitions due to a DBU
10 [rep] (P1 <= num_P1_M) -> repair : (P1 ’= num_P1_M);
11 // scrubbing can fix all the modules
12 endmodule
13
14 module Partition -2
15
16 P2 : [1.. num_P2_M] init num_P2_M;
17 // num_P2_M = 3 means all modules working fine , num_P2_M =
2 means one of the module is faulty , num_P2_M = 1 means
TMR failed
18 [] (P2 > 1) -> P2*lambda_P2 : (P2 ’=P2 -1);
19 // failure of a modules
20 [] (P2 = 2) -> lambda_P2 : (P1 ’= 2);
21 // the same module that already failed can fail again
22 [dbu] (P2 > 1) -> 1 : (P2 ’=P2 -1);
23 // synchronization with partition -1 to represent a DBU
24 [rep] (P2 <= num_P2_M) -> 1 : (P2 ’= num_P2_M);




29 formula fail = (P1 = 1) | (P2 = 1) ;
30 formula operational = !fail;
Figure 5.7: PRISM Code of a TMR with two partitions (SBU and DBU)
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Figure 5.8: SBU Markov model of TMR with two partitions
and Lambda P2 defines the failure rate of a domain in partition-1 and partition-2
respectively. The repair parameter in the model denotes the user defined scrub rate.
When the FPGA is scrubbed, SEUs in all the modules of each partition are repaired,
the synchronization label [rep] is used to model this phenomenon. Formula fail
and formula operational define that the system will fail if any of the partitions have
more than one faulty domains; otherwise the system is operational. Line 8 and Line
22 are related to MBU modeling, hence can be ignored for this part of the modeling.
Once the final model is built by the parallel composition of PRISM modules
using the PRISM model checker tool, quantitative analysis can be performed auto-
matically to analyze different design options. Note that, PRISM has a feature known
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Figure 5.9: DBU Markov model of TMR with two partitions
as Module renaming, which can be used to extend this model to N number of parti-
tions with minimal effort. The equivalent CTMC representation of this PRISM code
is shown in Figure 5.8 where λPi and λPj represent Lambda P1 and Lambda P2 in the
code.
5.2.2 Markov Modeling of Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs)
An SEU can flip two or more number of bits simultaneously in the FPGA configura-
tion bitstream. Since upsets of more than two simultaneous bits are not very common
(still occurs though with a very low probability), hence in this thesis, we limit our
modeling to Dobule-bit Upsets (DBUs). An SEU that causes a DBU may invoke fail-
ures in multiple TMR domains simultaneously. This situation is more common in a
harsh radioactive environment such as in outer space. Modeling of a combined model
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that include both SBU and DBU in a single Markov model requires an additional
assumption:
Assumption 1 : DBUs can occur at a specified rate and could effect two TMR domains
simultaneously in two separate partitions. In other words, this assumption means that
our modeling restricts failure of two simultaneous domains in the same partition.
Figure 5.9 shows the Markov model that considers the effect of both: SBUs and
DBUs. In the model, βPi and βPj represent the DBU rate of a domain in the first and
second partition respectively. For example, in state 8 both the partitions are working
fine. However, if one of the domains in the partitions encounters an SBU, then the
system can move to either state 5 or state 7, depending on the location of the domain.
Also, if the system is in state 8, and a DBU occurs in any domain of either partition,
it will trigger another domain failure in the other partition simultaneously. This leads
a path from state 8 to state 4 with the rate 3 ∗ βPj + 3 ∗ βPi.
Modeling DBU in PRISM is quite a challenge since it needs the use of syn-
chronization of associated commands in different modules to represent a simultaneous
failure due to a DBU. Line 8 and Line 22 in Figure 5.7 shows the PRISM codes
(Lambda P1D and Lambda P2D depict the DBU rate of domains in the corresponding
partition) that need to be added to model both SBU and DBU for two partitions.
For increased number of partitions, a number of extra synchronization commands are
added to each module. For instance, in the case of 4 partitions, each module in the
PRISM code will have three extra commands for synchronization of DBU failures.
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5.3 Quantitative Analysis of an FIR Filter using
PRISM
To illustrate the applicability of our approach, we analyze an 8-bit 64-tap FIR filter
(the target platform is Xilinx Virtex-5 SRAM-based FPGA) using both, the SBU
model and the combined model (that considers both SBUs and DBUs) for a different
number of partitions. An N-tap discrete finite impulse response (FIR) filtering can




x[n− i] · h[i]
x[ ], y[ ] and h[ ] are the input samples, output samples and the filter coefficients
respectively. All the experiments are conducted for a mission time of 1 month. Since
SEUs can cause both, either SBUs or DBUs, for the combined model, it was assumed
that 90% (αSBU = 0.9) of the SEUs will cause SBUs and 10% (αMBU = 0.1) of them
will cause DBUs. On the other hand, for the SBU model, it was assumed that all
the SEUs will only cause SBUs. Since the model is parametric, any other values for
scaling the SBU and DBU rates can be used. Table 5.1 shows the model generation
statistics for both models. For the analysis, four design options are analyzed using
our methodology, starting from no partition up to eight partitions. According to the
assumption 1 in MBU modeling, for DBU analysis we need at least two partitions.
So no partition option is ignored for the combined model. We use the PRISM model
checker version 4.1 to analyze the reliability and availability properties for each of
them.
Figure 5.10 shows the relationship between the reliability and number of parti-
tions in the design for different scrub intervals using the SBU model. Reliability of a
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Table 5.1: Model construction statistics
No. of No. of No. of Transitions No. of Transitions
partitions states SBU only model Combined model
0 3 6 N/A
2 9 26 30
4 81 362 578
8 6561 478858 129506
system (or component) is defined as the probability that the system performs correctly
for a given period of time, from zero (t0) to t1, given that the system or the component
was functioning correctly at t0. In PRISM, this property can be formalized in CSL
as P = ? [G[0,T] operational], T = 1 month, and we evaluate this property for
different scrub intervals starting from 15 minutes up to 4 hours. For all the design
options with different scrub intervals, the reliability decrease when the scrub interval
increases. However, designs with more partitions show significant improvements in
reliability even with the same scrub interval. For example, if the scrubbing interval
is 15 minutes, the design with no partition has a reliability of 0.71 only. In contrast,
the design with two, four and eight partitions has a reliability of 0.81, 0.90 and 0.94
respectively. TMR increases the area and power consumption by a factor of 300% as
a result of replications. More frequent scrub in such cases will consume more power
that might not be appropriate for most space applications. For such circumstances,
increasing the number of partitions can offer a good solution instead of a more frequent
scrub strategy. For example, if the designer is targeting the reliability more than 0.80,
and if the design has no partitions (or less number of partitions), then the designer
may think to adopt a more frequent scrubbing strategy (less than an hour, in order
of seconds or milliseconds) to meet the requirement. Instead of adding such power
burden on the system, the designer may adopt TMR with 2, 4 or 8 partitions, which
will require scrubbing once per 15 minutes (comparatively less power consumption)
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Figure 5.10: SBU Reliability
Figure 5.11: SBU Availability
and will also meet the requirement. Note that the design option with eight partitions
provides a reliability of 0.8 even for a delayed scrub of 1 hour. Using this approach a
designer can qualitatively assess the number of partitions required to meet the design
requirements for a given scrub rate or vice versa.
Availability is defined as the ratio of time the system or component operates
correctly (system uptime) to its entire mission time. Using the SBU model, Figure 5.11
shows the availability of the design for different scrub intervals and a different number
of partitions. In PRISM, this property can be formalized in CSL as R{"up time"} = ?
[ C<=T ]/T, T = 1 month. The design with only no partition offers the availability
of 5 nines (0.99999) for the scrub interval of 15 minutes which drops up to 1 nine (0.97)
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with increased scrub interval of 4 hours. Compared to this, all the other options with
TMR partitioning offers improved availability. For instance, for the scrub interval of
three hours, the design with no partition offers only 98% availability, whereas the rest
of the design options with partitioning offers the availability of more than 99%. Most
of the communication satellites targets more than 99% availability. In such cases, if
the power constraint restricts the designer not to increase the scrub interval, then the
increasing the number of partitions may offer a solution.
A major observation from these analyses is, when the scrub interval is smaller
(frequent scrub), the number of partitions plays a major role increasing the reliability
of a system. However, even for a delayed scrub, the improvement is noticeable enough.
In other words, the graphs show a trend that, the more the number of partitions
(which means smaller domains), the less frequent scrub will be required to meet a
target reliability. Less number of partitions (larger domain size) will require more
frequent scrub to meet a target reliability requirement. For availability, the number
of partitions plays a significant role for longer scrub intervals. For frequent scrub
intervals, the number of partitions increases the availability to a minimal level, but
for longer scrub intervals the improvement of availability with the number of partitions
is quite significant. Such early analysis on the high-level design description will allow
a designer to perform the analysis before the actual implementation of the system
considering the design constraints such as power. Using such methodology a designer
can find the trade-off between the number of partitions and the required scrub interval
that will meet the design requirements, and also reduce the design effort, time and
cost.
For the second part of our analysis, we evaluated the same reliability and avail-
ability properties using the combined model. The results are shown in Figure 5.12
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Figure 5.12: Combined Reliability
Figure 5.13: Combined Availability
and Figure 5.13. We observe that for both the properties, all the design options with
two, four and eight partitions increases the reliability and availability compared to the
design with no partition. The reliability and availability are improved to a minimal
level when the number of partition increases from two to four. However, it clearly
shows that the TMR with eight partitions is less reliable and available compared with
the TMR with two and four partitions, which contrast the SBU only model. From
this, we can conclude that the optimal number of partitions for this model is four
if the design is prone to both SBUs and DBUs. This is due to the fact that, after
partitioning the design into a certain number of partitions, any extra partition added
to the design also increases the probability of DBUs causing a system-wide failure.
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Similar findings for Domain Crossing Event (DCE) to suggest an optimal number
of partitions was reported in [46] using fault injection. In our case, we are able to
perform such analysis at the early design stage.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the last part of our proposed methodology, that is the
formal modeling and analysis of SBUs and MBUs using probabilistic model checking.
Our analysis shows that increasing the number of TMR partitions can reduce the fre-
quency of scrubbing, which will eventually result in less power consumption. However,
if the design is prone to both SBUs and DBUs, then there exists an optimal number
for partitioning. Using the proposed methodology, designers can assess the number
of partitions, or the scrub frequency required to meet the design requirement at early
design stages. To validate these claims, we have shown the results of our analysis
for a 64-tap FIR filter case study. The results showed how the increased number of
partitions can cope with the less frequent scrubs and vice-versa.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis proposed a methodology for high-level dependability and performability
analysis of SEU prone SRAM-based FPGA designs. We illustrated how the proba-
bilistic model checking technique can be used to analyze designs at early stages for
space applications. The proposed methodology allows designers to perform three dif-
ferent types of analysis: design options analysis for performability optimization, scrub
interval optimization with design assurance level analysis, and optimal partitioning of
TMR. From the high-level design description, the CDFG is extracted first. Depend-
ing on the required analysis, a branch of the methodology is chosen. To follow this
process, the CDFG is then modeled in the PRISM model checker with the help of
other necessary information for further analysis. To demonstrate the applicability of
the proposed methodology, we presented case studies on benchmark DSP circuits. To
our knowledge, this is the first work in this area that shows the use of probabilistic
model checking for the high-level dependability analysis of SEU prone FPGA-based
systems.
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For the first part of the methodology, various design options were analyzed,
each of which was modeled using a Markov reward model. Such modeling captures
the possible failures, fault detection coverage and repairs (scrubbing, rescheduling,
cold-spare) possible in a high-altitude radiation environment. Afterwards, a wide
range of properties were exhaustively and automatically verified to evaluate the de-
sign options, regarding throughput, area, and dependability. The obtained results
showed how coverage can impact the dependability and performability based on mis-
sion time, scrub interval and adopted mitigation strategy. Interestingly, we found that
coverage alone can not guarantee high reliability. Also, it was observed that in some
cases, rescheduling can serve as a better mitigation technique when compared to the
redundancy-based solutions.
As the second part of the methodology, we showed how our method can be used
to verify the high-availability requirements and the design assurance level compliance
at high-level. Since in classical Markov chains the delay is exponentially distributed,
we utilized the Erlang distribution to accurately model the scrub intervals. The
obtained modeling results showed how an appropriate scrub interval (slowest scrub
rate) can be found to save power while meeting the dependability requirements.
Finally, in the last part of our methodology, we analyzed the scrubbed parti-
tioned TMR systems for optimal partitioning. Our modeling is novel compared to
others since the proposed model can evaluate both equal and non-equal sized par-
titions. Also, instead of concentrating only on single-bit upsets, the modeling of
double-bit upsets was also introduced. Based on the obtained results, we concluded
that for designs that are prone to both single and double bit upsets, an optimal num-
ber of TMR partitions can be found. Using our method, we were able to find the
optimal partitioning at early design stages instead of adopting the fault injection or
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beam testing approaches.
From system biology to gate-level circuit analysis, from robotics to chemical
reaction — probabilistic model checking has already been used in many different
domains. During this research work, we realized that probabilistic model checking
has great applicability in the area of SEE analysis. The randomness of the radioactive
environment, with different fault mitigation techniques and their associated trade-offs,
makes it an ideal problem statement that be analyzed automatically using state-of-
the-art probabilistic model checker tools. We analyzed designs at a high-level, hence
the state explosion problem was not encountered during our research. The PRISM
model checker can handle up to 1010 states. Due to this fact, it is possible to handle
even larger designs if the CDFG to PRISM modeling part is fully automated.
6.2 Future Work
Dependability analysis is one of the most important phases in the design flow for
complex systems. For the case of space applications, an early analysis may help to
verify the design requirements in early design phases. In addition to increasing the
designer’s confidence in the design, such analysis may also reduce the associated cost,
time and design effort. This thesis lays the ground for a promising approach for the
early dependability analysis of SEU prone FPGA-based applications. Building on
the proposed methodology and verification results presented in this thesis, several
extensions can be explored to further strengthen the proposed method. Some future
research directions are outlined as follows.
• TMR techniques are traditionally used to mitigate SEUs, but with an over-
whelming amount of extra area and power. In [42], the authors proposed a
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framework for reconfigurable fault tolerance that enables designers to dynami-
cally change the amount of redundancy for fault mitigation. Such a technique
can be modeled using the concept of the Phased-mission Markov model to es-
timate the achieved performability gains. The inclusion of such dynamic mit-
igation models in our proposed methodology can be an interesting extension.
This will also help to find how effective the rescheduling-based fault mitigation
techniques are if adopted as an option in the dynamic fault mitigation strategy.
• In this thesis, we explored the effect of SEUs at a high-level. However, it is
possible to include other fault models using our method, such as analyzing design
failures due to aging, electromigration, hot electron effects, and Negative-Bias
Temperature Instability (NBTI) and Single-Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI).
• For the design options analysis, we considered the area and throughput metric
while modeling performability. In an FPGA design, even if a component fails,
it will still consume power (providing the wrong results until the scrub fixes the
SEUs). Using our method, it is possible to model such a phenomenon by adding
the component’s power consumption as a reward in the Markov Reward model
to further optimize the power consumption.
• In this thesis, we used Erlang distribution to model the blind scrub. An inter-
esting extension of this work can be the use of Erlang distribution for modeling
the partial reconfiguration (read-back scrubbing). In that case, the modeling of
two discrete time intervals are required: time to detect the fault and time to
fix the fault. In addition, the TMR voter’s fault coverage can also be added to
the model for better accuracy. It is worth mentioning that we have already ap-
plied a similar approach for accurate reliability, availability and maintainability
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analysis of a single satellite system [Bio-Cf3].
• In the part of the methodology where the TMR partitions were analyzed, only
the single and double bit upsets were considered. It is worth mentioning that
due to the rapid decrease of the transistor size, three or more bit upsets are also
not uncommon these days. Using a similar approach to the one we introduced in
optimal TMR partitioning, it is possible to extend our model to handle upsets in
a larger number of bits. Another interesting future work could be to include the
partial reconfiguration (read-back scrubbing) in the model in order to explore
the effect of unreliable voters in the TMR partitions.
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